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Summary:
This study focuses on the National Conservation Strategies of Botswana and Zambia. The
strategies contain detailed elaborations about environmental problems, goals, means and
implementation. The implementation of the NCSs depend on a number of conditions and the
main part of this analysis discusses whether these efforts are likely to produce the intended
changes. The conclusions reached are that the efforts wil most likely have effects on
governmental performance, but that the effects wil probably be unexpected and that some
intended effects wil not materialise.
Sammendrag:
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for miljøvernet. Gjennomføringen av strategiene avhenger aven rekke betingelser, og
hoveddelen av analysen diskuterer hvorvidt disse tiltakene vil føre til de ønskete endringer.
Studien konkluderer med at tiltakene vil ha klare virkninger på offentlig iverksettingskapasitet,
men at virkningene vil være uventete og at noen av dem vil utebli.
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Preface
What can be done to address the environmental problems in Africa? Protecting
the natural environment of African societies is an important goal because people's
lives depend upon its achievement. The environmental problems are accelerating,
and they are among the causes of poverty in African societies. But how can they
be addressed? How can structures and processes which wil focus continuously on
these matters be established? Are national comprehensive plans an answer?
I first heard of the National Conservation Strategy of Botswana in 1989, when I
was in Botswana doing field work for my master thesis. I soon learned that also
other countries had formulated or were about to formulate such national strategies.
The strategies looked impressive. They dealt with a whole range of problems, they
formulated sub-goals and means. They designated responsibilities. Implementing
all this would quite obviously be a huge challenge, and it seemed reasonable to
expect that it would pose problems. My aim in this study is to point out more
precisely what problems we should be prepared to encounter. The hope is that it
wil be auseful contribution to those who work with these issues from day to day.
The contribution I hope to make, is to give names and labels to likely problems.
But I wil also argue, as I do in the concluding chapter, that such strategies may
be worthwhile even if they produce results that are different from those envisioned
in the NCS documents. The study is based on literature studies and on short visits
to Lusaka, Gaborone and to IUCN head quarters in Geneva in 1992.
Alf Morten Jerve has commented the contents and language of this study. The
study was made possible by a generous grant from the Royal Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. I would also like to thank the Chr. Michelsen Institute for a
pleasant working place during most of the period I have worked on this study.
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1. Introduction
The environmental problems in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are now recognised as
a major challenge by most governments in the area. Among the reasons for this
development are increasing donor pressure, a worsening of the environmental
degradation and a growing amount of research documenting the seriousness of the
problems and their consequences.
The trend in most countries seems to be to address the environmental issues by
means of national, comprehensive policies. One group of countries has formulated
National Environmental Action Plans in cooperation with the World Bank.
Another group has developed National Conservation Strategies assisted by the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN)
(Toulmin 1991: 27). Botswana and Zambia are two countries found in the latter
group, and our study object is the National Conservation Strategies of these two
countries.
The National Conservation Strategies (NCS) are impressive. They address a whole
range of important problems and they have high ambitions. Jf these plans or at
least parts of them can be put into practice, that would be an important and very
encouraging achievement. The question is naturally if they really can be
implemented. The study of implementation processes has developed rapidly the
last 20 years. Students of African development have also increasingly come to
realize the importance of the processes of putting plans and programs into practice.
It is now common knowledge that implementation often fails in Africa.
Nurnerous conditions for successful implementation have been identified in the
literature (van Meter and van Horn 1975). One group of conditions focuses on the
qualities of the policy itself. Another group focuses on characteristics of the
irnplernenting organisations. A third group focuses on the relationship between
irnplementors and target groupS.l We wil in particular examine the two latter
types of conditions. These conditions are recognised by the policy rnakers in both
countries, and efforts are planned to rneet them. Our main concern is what
Included in these groups of conditions are that goals have to be clear, consistent and clearly
communicated, the implementing agencies must have sufficient capacity and the right type of
capacity, the active support and endorsement of the policy mus t be developed among the
implementors, the policy itself must be based on relevant means-ends knowledge, policy makers
must have some means to control the implementing agency and finally , the implementing
agencies must handle powerful actors in the environment who wish to alter the policy.
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prospects these efforts have to meet the conditions and thus facilitate
implementation.
These objectives require the following steps in our discussion:
1. What requirements do the policies impose on the governmental apparatuses
in the two countries? We wil focus on a few, which are also identified as
crucial by the policy makers. First is the requirement that a whole range of
agencies in the governmental machinery has to take up new tasks of a
conservationise nature, i.e. that they change their present activities in a
conservationist direction. The sec ond requirement is that various agencies
coordinate and integrate their respective activities in cross-sectoral programs.
Third is the requirement that this policy and its implementation are adjusted
to local variations regarding what problems to address and how, and that it
mobilizes the knowledge and the resources of local populations. Finally,
donors have to be activated and contribute funds and expertise.
2. To what extent are the governmental agencies capable of meeting these
requirements? As wil be shown below, there are reasons for concern.
3. What measures are suggested to increase this capability? The designers of
the environmental policies in both countries have identified several
shortcomings, and have proposed a number of measures to enhance the
capability of government institutions to act according to the policies.
4. Wil these measures enable government organisations to play the kind of
role that the policies require? This is the main question of this study.
Environmental policy is a broad category and can be defined in a number of ways.
In this study we take as a point of departure that the National Conservation
Strategies of Botswana and Zambia are perceived as centre pieces of their
environmental policy, and we willimit our discussions to the NCSs.
It is stil too early to evaluate these strategies, as well as the actual effects of the
measures proposed to facilitate their implementation. The NCSs have just been
launched. Thus, this study is no evaluation of performance, but an attempt to point
out where problems are likely to occur in the process of implementation.
The data material for the present analysis comprises of interviews with civil
servants, NGO representatives, IUCN officials and NORAD personneI working in
2
The terms conservation and environmental policy and protection are used as synonyms,
conservation being the term most of ten applied in the policy documents.
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both Zambia and Botswana. Furthermore, the plan documents of the National
Conservation Strategies have been examined. 3
In the following chapters, we wil first outline in brief what problems the policies
address, how the policies have developed, what general objectives they contain and
what requirements for governmental action the policies prescribe. From this
background, we move on to discuss the prospects of the various measures to
facilitate implementation of the NCSs.
Our main objective is to identify possible probIerns of an organisational nature in
the cases of the two NCSs. However, these conditions are of importance for
environmental policy making and implementation in most African countries. We
observe that in most countries, the environmental problems are met with national
comprehensive plans. Jf the conditions for such planning cannot be met in the case
of our two NCSs, than there is reason to be sceptical about the prospects of
similar plans as well.
3 These documents include the formally approved plans, some of the preparatory memoranda,
drafts of proposals for organisation, and some conference proceedings and pro gress reports.
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PART I
BACKGROUND: ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS,
GOALS AND POLICY MEANS
2. The development of the National
Conservation Strategies in Botswana and
Zambia
The environmental degradation in Zambia and Botswana is not an entirely new
phenomenon. Overgrazing was recognised as a serious problem in Botswana
already in the 1930's. In Zambia, environmental protection early became an issue
for the colonial administration, and regulation on land use, notably forests, was
introduced by the colonial authorities (GOZ 1985: 27).
However, like most newly independent states, Botswana and Zambia saw
environmental protection as a low priority task. It was perceived that this objective
was far less important than the one of socio-economic development, and
environmental policy was understood as a complicating factor in development
processes (Baker 1989; Colby 1990). Furthermore, regulation on the use of natural
resources was discredited as ilegitimate colonial repression.4 Consequently,
environmental issues were largely ignored. In recent years, however, they have
come high up on the political agenda.
Before the National Conservation Strategies were initiated, both countries had
already adopted fragments of an environmental policy, trying to solve acute
probIerns within various sectors. The NCSs in contrast, represent an ambition to
formulate a national, integrated strategy, encompassing all sectors and activities.
In other words, the NCSs imply a change in scope as well as in integration of the
environmental policy in both countries.
The processes leading to the formulation of the National Conservation Strategies
in Botswana and Zambia are quite paralleI. Both processes were launched in the
early eighties. In 1983, the Government of Botswana invited the International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) to assist in the
development of the strategy. The IUCN provided expatriate expertise and
consultancies. IUCN' s assistance was largely funded by NORAD, SIDA, UNDP,
UNEP, the Netherlands, EEC and USAID (GOB 1986: 11-13; 1990a: 2).
The Zambian National Conservation Strategy came as a result of contacts and
discussions between the very top politicalleadership of the country and IUCN.
4 See for instance Matiko (1990), for the case of Tanzania. Interview Mr. Maimbolwa, Lusaka,
april 1992.
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After a feasibility study, the work on the National Conservation Strategy was
launched in early 1984 and completed by the end of the same year. As in
Botswana, a permanent IUCN mission assisted the project, and the Swedish and
Dutch donor agencies provided funds (GOZ 1985: 18).
In both countries, the key policy makers were a relatively limited group of
government officiaIs, assisted by IUCN advisors. In Botswana, a group of officials
in the Department of Town and Regional Planning, Ministry of Local Government
and Lands coordinated, guided and kept up the momenturn in the policy making
process (GOB 1990a: 2). Task forces and technical committees with
representatives from the various agencies were mobilized and put to work in a
coordinated manner, providing background papers and know ledge. In Zambia, a
small secretariat in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources led a larger,
multi-sectoral Task Force, which organised and coordinated the work. More
background information was provided by a 30 member Technical Group,
representing various agencies and interests groups (GOZ 1985: 8).
In Zambia, the NCS was approved by the Cabinet and the UNIP Central
Committee in 1985. However, soon after the political approval, the NCS
encountered probIerns. A serious economic, social and political crisis paralysed the
Government and it was not until 4 - 5 years later that the process got back on
the track. In Botswana the process took more time. There was controversy over
the livestock policies signalled in the NCS, and the NCS was not approved by the
Cabinet and the National Assembly until 1990.
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3. Main is su es addressed by the National
Conservation Strategies of Botswana and
Zambia
The National Conservation Strategies address a whole range of issues. The
question of whether these issues are the most important ones and whether they are
correctly understood is beyond the scope of this report. In general, the policies
seem to inc1ude the problems most frequently mentioned in the literature. Thus,
we wil only briefly outlne the problems addressed in the policy documents.5
Water scarcity
Botswana suffers from scarcity of water, and more efficient management is
urgently needed. The many different needs for water put a very heavy pressure on
water resources, whose carring capacity is not sufficiently well known (GOB
1990a: 20-21). Zambia has larger water resources, but also in Zambia, increasing
demands for water combined with poor management systems and infrastructure,
make water shortage a prospect within less than 10 years. An additional problem
is the serious pollution of water supplies in are as with intensive mining and
industry (GOZ 1985: 55).
Deforestatìon
In both countries, trees and bushes are an important source of energy, and
construction, fencing and crafts also depend on wood resources. Around towns and
larger settlements bush and forests are bein g depleted at an accelerating pace
(GOB 1990a: 23; GOZ 1985: 23-27), which in turn leads to erosion, reduces water
catchment capacity and increases off-take of remaining forestry resources.
Numerous causes of deforestation are identified. A particular problem in large
parts of Zambia is slash-and-burn agriculture (chitemene) (GOZ 1985: 24-25;
5 Environmental policy guidelines in both countries identify control of the population increase
as an important issue (GOB 1990a: 27; GOZ 1985: 53-54). Both countries have very high
growth rates, that have to be reduced. However, even if this is presented as a major problem,
not much is said about operational goals and practical means. This contrasts with the other
problems identified. This issue wil therefore be left out in the remaining analysis.
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NORAGRIC 1989).6 Overgrazing is mentioned as a cause, as it prevents forests
to regenerate CGOZ 1985: 26). The problem is not only the magnitude of the forest
off-take. It is also the lack of coordination among various users.
Overgrazing
This is seen as the most urgent problem in Botswana CGOB 1990a: 23), but also
in Zambia is this a serious problem in areas where people keep livestock CGOZ
1985: 33). The consequences of overgrazing inc1ude increasing losses of animals,
diminishing returns on livestock production, soil erosion and deforestation.
The causes of overgrazing are numerous. Management systems have increasingly
proved incapable of preventing over-exploitation of common grazing lands.
Governments ' development policies, in particular in Botswana, have allowed and
encouraged expansion of the national herd without sufficient regard to ecological
conditions CGOB 1990a: 22-23). Arable expansion into grazing areas has
intensified the probIerns.
Pressure on wildlife and natural vegetation
Protection of natural fauna and flora requires considerable areas of land, and in
both Botswana and Zambia, these needs for land conflct with land requirements
for livestock and agriculture. Zambia experiences severe pressure on wildlife
resources as well as on reserved land, endangering valuable species and eco-
systems CGOZ 1985: 42). Pressure on wildlife resources is a problem in Botswana
as well. To stop the depletion of veId products is given particularly high priority
CGOB 1990a: 24-25). While wildlife is threatened by human activities, wildlife
also creates problems for human activities, for instance, arable farming through
crop damage.
In Botswana, the cattle industry causes problems by expanding the grazing areas,
and by erecting cordon fences that interfere with wildlife migration routes. There
are multiple c1aims on wildlife and natural vegetation in both countries. Local
people need hunting and gathering grounds, the tourism industry needs the
resources and there is strong claim for the preservation of resources for aesthetic
reasons CGOZ 1985: 42). The problem of poaching is also significant.
6 Chitemene is a traditional form of cultivation, which was sustainable as long as land was
allowed sufficient fallow periods. Due to increasing population pressures this is no longer the
case in many areas.
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Industrial and urban pollution
There is a growing problem of pollution from settlements. Disposal of waste is
arbitrary and sanitary infrastructure is not adequately developed in Zambia (GOZ
1985: 38). Botswana's settlements of ten suffer from the same problems (GOB
1990a: 25). Pollution from mines and industry is also recognised as a significant
problem, although such sites are not numerous, particularly in Botswana. But the
problem is aggravated by the fact that settlements are often located near industri al
sites and mines (GOZ 1985: 52; GOB 1990a: 25-26).
These probIerns are caused by neglect and poor governmental control and
legislation. Not least local governments have failed to develop satisfactory sanitary
infrastructure. Furthermore, industries, particularly in Zambia, are outdated and
worn down, due to sinking profits and shortage of foreign currency for import of
spare parts and improved technology.
Agriculture
Arable farming is not included in Botswana' s list of priority issues although it is
perceived as a problematic area, e.g. concerning soil erosion (GOB 1990a: 2).
Zambia makes agriculture a more prominent issue in its environmental policy.
Poor cultivation techniques, overgrazing, deforestation, inadequate fallow periods
and poor crop rotation systems all contribute to erosion and diminishing
agricultural output (GOZ 1985: 30-32). Other pertinent probIerns are dangerous
use of chemicals and inconsistency between production types and ecological
potential, due to price and other incentives promoting cultivation of a particular
crop, while the land may better suited for other crops.
Poverty andunderdevelopment
A recurrent theme is that the development process is dependent on the solution of
environment al probIerns. On the other hand, the environmental probIerns result
among others from poverty and underdevelopment. It is emphasized that if
exploitation of resources can be made optimal and sustainable, this wil be a major
contribution to the development process and to the struggle against poverty. Which
wil further improve the resource management systems.
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4. Objectives of the National Conservation
Strategies
The NCSs comprise of a whole range of objectives and not all of them can be
reviewed here. We can identify three overall objectives that are more or less the
same in the two countries.
l. All resources should be in use. In the documents one can hardly trace any
concerns for protecting nature for its own sake. It is perceived that each country
is dependent on its own resources, and the emphasis is on maximum utilisation for
the benefit of development. The policy documents stress that an environmental
policy should aim at identifying untapped potentials and it is argued that this is
one of the ways in which environmental policies may assist the development
process.
It follows that more information should be gathered about what resources exist.
The NCSs do also identify some inadequately tapped resources. For instance,
fisheries in Botswana are said to have an untapped potential and fores t resources
as well as agriculturalland are said to be under-utilzed in Zambia CGOZ 1985:
17,23; GOB 1990a: 14).
2. All use of resources should be sustainable. The concept of sustainability is of ten
criticized for not being a very c1ear analytical concept CJerve 1990). Here it is
applied as a political principle, meaning that renewable resources should be us ed
in ways allowing it to regenerate and to be harvested indefinitely.
The policies identify a number of resource exploitation practices that are definitely
unsustainable, and in need of changes. Exploitation of water, arable land, forests,
pastures, fish and wildlife are all pointed out as areas where substantial changes
are needed in both countries CGOZ 1985: 65; GOB 1990a: 7,38).
The changes that are required to fulfil the goal of sustainabilty inc1ude first of all,
changes in technology. Exploitation can only be made sustainable if improved
technologies in production, proeessing and consumption are adopted. Secondly,
and of equal importance, are changes in the resource management systems,
inc1uding land use planning, management of cornon resources and land tenure.
Along with these changes there wil be a need for infrastructure development.
3. The use of resources must be optimal CGOB 1990a: 2; GOZ 1985: 15). This
means that the use of aresource should be as efficient and profitable as possible.
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Efficiency and profit can be greatly enhanced by reducing losses and waste of
harvested resources. It is a goal to improve storage technology and marketing
infrastructure, e.g. for fisheries and agricultural products CGOZ 1985: 36,49).
Optimal off-take of aresource requires that there is a well functioning
management system, which can regulate accurately how much can be harvested
at various points in time. The development of improved management systems for
groups of users as well as individual users is considered important.
Furthermore, resources used should be further processed and value-added. Zambia
points out this challenge within fisheries and fore stry CGOZ 1985: 23,29,49). In
and near urban centres, the agricultural and fuel wood production potential should
be better utilized and managed in sustainable ways, as there is a growing market
for these products.
Strongly emphasized in both countries is the potential of multiple use of resources.
This inc1ude agro-forestry, combining controlled off-take of wildlife with local
communities' needs for hunting and multiple use of water CGOZ 1985: 65).
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5. Policy means and governmental action
How do the NCSs envision that these goals can be reached? Even if substantial
emphasis is placed on education and information that may motivate people to take
a responsibilty for conservation themselves, the heaviest responsibilty is placed
on the government al apparatus. As already indicated, the NCSs point out a large
number of fields where the Governments have to intervene with assistance,
guidance, technology, credit, training, regulation and planning. The policies do not
spell out in detail what should be done within various sectors and sub-sectors.
However, we can outline a framework for implementation of the strategies. The
general approach is that the existing governmental structure should elaborate
specific programs and projects. Among the principal guidelines for this
implementation are:
1. The sectoral agencies have a primary responsibility to solve the environment al
probIerns within their fields, and to adjust present activities to the NCS guidelines.
2. Due to the cross-sectoral character of environmental problems, governmental
agencies are expected to cooperate c10sely and to design integrated programs and
projects.
3. Because the probIerns and potentials var greatly throughout the country, local
adjustment of policies is absolutely necessary. Furthermore, implementation should
seek to mobilze the knowledge and resources of the local people. Finally,
implementation has to be adjusted to people' s perceptions, wishes, interests and
needs in order to build legitimacy and acceptance,.
4. The strategies aim at quite massive action, in many sectors and locations. This
means that donor support is absolutely necessary. Neither Botswana nor Zambia
dispose the required financial and professional resources, and need assistance.
These guide lines for implementation wil be elaborated in the following section.
Our main concern is whether the expectations and demands expressed by the NCS
can be met.
5.1 Expectations to the performance of sectoral agencies
The NCSs place heavy requirements on the governmental agencies who are
responsible for sectoral and national policies affecting the use of resources.
Agencies that deal with livestock, agriculture, fisheries, forests, water resources,
and wildlife are in paricular singled out as key actors in both countries.
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The present activities of these agencies are seen as not sufficiently consistent with
the new environmental policies, and changes are required. This means firstly, that
already existing environmental responsibilities have to be addressed more
forcefully. In particular the Zambian policy emphasizes this concerning sectors like
forestry, agriculture, wildlife and fisheries (GOZ 1985: 26-28,32,42,48-49). Also
Botswana recognises the problem of poor enforcement of existing environmental
rules and regulations due to shortage of funds and skiled manpower (GOB 1990a:
15,21-23,32).
Secondly, the various agencies are expected to develop new, specific
environmental goals and premises for their sector, and adjust their ordinary
projects to these. The policy makers in Botswana explicitly point out various
agricultural projects that have to be adjusted (GOB 1990a: 48). It is underlined
that Environmental Impact Assessments have to be included in the planning of all
projects of environmental relevance (GOB 1990a: 70-72). Also the Zambian policy
states that environmental principles have to be integrated in all sectors. For
instance agricultural extension programs, town planning and tourism development
projects all need adjustment to environmental goals (GOZ 1985: 32-34,40-46,64).
Thirdly, policies that are unsustainable should be phased out. The Botswana policy
states that destumping for arable development has to be stopped, but it seerns
mainly to be left to the sectoral departments and ministries to identify which
activities are unsustainable.
Fourthly, it is required that these agencies take up new tasks. For instance, the
Zambian policy signalizes new activities such as promotion of fuelwood
plantations and community planting for fuelwood purposes, and systematic
attention to urban agriculture in town planning (GOZ 1985: 26-28,40-41). These
are new tasks for the Forestry Department and the urban planning authorities. In
the case of Botswana, it is proposed that the Water Deparment should engage in
provision of management systems for water resources and the Department of
Wildlife and National Parks should take up development of wildlife based
industries (GOB 1990a: 21,36).
5.2 Inter-organisational change
In order to realize the ambitions of the policies, important changes are needed also
in the relationship among the various governmental agencies. This requirement to
implementation has several aspects.
In both Zambia and Botswana, governmental policy is frarned by a national
planning system, administered by the MFDP (Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning) in Botswana, and by NCDP (National Comrssion of
Development Planning) in Zambia. MFDP is a quite effective and powerful system
14
(Gasper 1989). NCDP is also powerful, but it is by many observers seen as an old-
fashioned planning mechanism that creates more problems than it solves. At
present, the NCDP' s role is under consideration, as part of major reorganisations.
The future role of NCDP is stil unsettled, but an overall framework of national
planning wil remain. It is important that these national planning structures
facilitate and prornote the new environmental policy. It is realized in both
countries that environmental premises have to be integrated in this national
planning system. Both to allow environmental project ideas from the agencies, and
to actively promote the initiation of such (GOZ 1985: 69; GOB 1990a: 33,69).
The Botswana NCS is said to depend on the MFDP, and is envisioned to be
integrated in the National Development Plan (GOB 1990a: 33,69). The Zambian
policy likewise stresses the need to eng age the NCDP (GOZ 1985: 69).
Another requirement is that various governmental agencies avoid launching
projects which together wil over-exploit any resource. This is a matter of
coordination. Both policies emphasize strongly that inter-sectoral coordination is
poor, and in need of improvement ( GOZ 1985: 18,58 and GOB 1990a: 25,59).
Optimal resource management implies planned multi~purpose use, like agro-
forestry. It is required that various agencies should develop such activities in
cooperation. The Zambian policy aims at integration of agricultural and forestry
programs and extension. Wildlife issues should be addressed in ways integrated
with agriculture, tourism and forestry projects. The development of tourism and
infrastructure has to be integrated with the infrastructure needs of other sectors,
and the various users of water resources have to integrate their activities (GOZ
1985: 29,44-49). The Botswana NCS clearly emphasizes that the policy has to be
based on interventions that actively and directly prornote integrated, multi-purpose
use of resources. It is even suggested that development planning may be based on
a concept of ecological zones (GOB 1990a: 33,44-47).
5.3 Field implementation
The challenges for institutions at the sub-nationalleve1 are formidable. The field
staff of sectoral ministries, the district administrations as well as the local
governments are all expected to cooperate in integrated resource management.
All the activities proposed in the NCSs imply substantial workloads for the field
units. Not least because many activities wil be quite demanding, requiring
experimentation, data collection and local adjustment in addition to administration
and advice.
The needs for integration at the nationallevel, pointed out by the NCSs are valid
also at the locallevel. The NCSs expect that the field services of various agencies,
local governments, and district administrations integrate their activities. In
15
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Botswana, for instance, envisions that units implementing forestry projects,
livestock development and conservation projects cooperate with the District
Administration. Furthermore, District Land Use Plans should link the problems of
the wildlife and pollution (GOB 1990a: 55-60). This is seen as a prerequisite for
integrated resource management systems that also benefit the local people (GOB
1990a: 35,41,52). The Zambian policy also emphasizes strongly the need for
integration of fie1d staff. The departments of Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry and
Natural Resources should all be integrated. Furthermore, District Councils should
participate in fore stry projects in cooperation with the local staff of the Forestry
Department (GOZ 1985: 29,32,75-76).
It is recognised in the NCSs that it is important to adjust implementation to local
circumstances and to ensure that the people contribute actively in environmental
projects (GOZ 1985: 76; GOB 1990a: 47). This means that implementors have to
work c10sely with the local people. First, the latter are the holders of detailed
knowledge about local ecological, social and economic conditions. These vary
greatly, and many projects wil not succeed without careful attention to these
issues. Second, many projects wil depend on resources from the local people, i.e.
labour, land and resources spent on future maintenance of infrastructure. Such
relationships, it is argued, wil only occur if people themselves see any benefit
from it. Thus, projects depend on being adjusted to local needs (GOZ 1985:
45,65). The NCSs list numerous reasons for participation; it facilitates self-help,
it eases pressure on governmental resources for implementation, it reveals local
needs, it makes people engaged so that maintenance can be left to them, and
finally, it utilizes local skilIs and knowledge (GOZ 1985: 76).
5.4 Donor involvement
Both countries hope that donors wil play a major role, contributing to specific
projects, to research and to building of indigenous competence (GOZ 1985: 57).
This is a crucial matter particularly in Zambia as the Government finances and the
administrative system are in a very poor state. Parts of the Zambian public
administration hardly function at all. Funding for both recurrent costs and
investments is extremely inadequate. But also Botswana rely significantly on donor
engagement in the environmental field (GOB 1990a: 36,62).
The problem, however, is not only to mobilize donors, but also to channel their
contribution into the NCSs' framework of goals, implementing principles and
organisational framework. In other words, to prevent that donors apply the bypass
strategies that have been resorted
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6. Facilitating implementation
Basically, the organisational model is to operationalise and implement the NCSs
through existing agencies, and to avoid setting up large new agencies. In Zambia,
the launching of the NCS coincides in time with the establishment of a new
Ministry for Environment, but this ministry only contains two departments that
previously belonged to the now dissolved Ministry of Lands, Water and Natural
Resources, I.e. the Forestry Department and the Department of Natural Resources.
There are suggestions to strengthen a number of deparments in Zambia and
Botswana. It is repeatedly argued that the various agencies are in need of more
personneI, more skiled personneI, and more funds. It is suggested that more
people are hired, and that those already employed are trained so that they can
handle the new policies. In some cases, it is sugge sted to take Zambian personneI
out of the regular salary ladder, and to pay them enough so that they can afford
to work full time. This wil depend on donor funding. These suggestions apply
also to the sub-nationallevels.
What is new, is the establishment of special, national policy coordinating
mechanisms in both Zambia and Botswana. It is decided to form a Council with
broad representation from relevant government agencies, academic institutions and
NGOs.7 The Councils are expected to perform a variety of tasks. They wil be in
charge of most of the measures that are intended to facilitate implementation.
First, to develop the national policies further. The environmental situation wil be
monitored and new policy initiatives may be suggested. Second, the Councils are
expected to coordinate and integrate the activities of the various governmental
agencies, NGOs and donors. In order to facilitate this task, the Councils may
organise themselves in sub-committees and task forces. Third, the Councils are
expected to encourage and support research concerning environment al probIerns.
They are also expected to launch education and information campaigns directed
towards resource users throughout the country, and towards decision makers in the
administration. In general, the belief in the impact of information and education
is noteworthy. It is a recurrent theme in the policy documents. Fourth, the
Councils are expected to coordinate donor contributions and monitor donor funded
activities. Fifth, as the Councils wil have rather small implementing capacities on
their own, they wil largely dep end on other agencies to plan and implement
7 National Environment Council, Zambia, and National Conservation Board, Botswana. They wil
be referred to as the national environmental councils. The data on these councils, their function
and staff is gathered from the policy documents themselves, and from interviews with a number
of informants in both countries.
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projects. Information and education campaigns are among the few tasks that the
Councils and secretariats wil implement themselves. The Zambian Council and
its secretariat wil, however, have some regulatory powers and its own budget to
cary out some projects. Also the counterpart in Botswana wil have some
financial means, but wil have smaller implementing capacity than the Zambian
counterpart.
The councils wil have weak formal hierarchical powers. Instead, the
environmental policy is expected to evolve based on consensus built on
persuasion, information and education. However, if the planning ministries in both
countries cooperate with the councils, that would give the councils access to
hierarchical power over reluctant agencies.
The Councils wil be served by a secretariat. 8 The Zambian secretariat wil contain
two Inspectorates and two Environmental Management Services. One Inspectorate
wil work on pollution control. In addition to monitoring, it wil have regulatory
powers, and it wil have inspectors in the fie1d. Some of these are already hired.
The other Inspectorate wil focus on natural resources, i.e. land use, soil, fore stry ,
fisheries and wildlife. They wil mainly monitor and coordinate research and
advise the Council as well as the agencies. The Environmental Management
Services wil have two sub-units. One unit wil provide services for the agencies
in the area of project planning and environmental assessments. The other unit wil
provide information, prornote research and run information and education
campaigns.
The proposed set-up in Botswana has a unit for research, education, training and
management assistance. Another unit wil have specialists in resource planning,
land use, agriculture, water, energy, wildlife and natural re source economics.
Besides supporting the Council, these units wil offer advice, training and research
to the various governmental agencies involved in environmental policy.
The Councils, as well as the governmental agencies wil also be served by
specialized sub-comrttees of professional advisors. The Councils and their
secretariats wil be semi-autonomous in the governmental structure and not under
the instructions of a ministry .
8 National Conservation Strategy Agency in Botswana, National Environment Council Secretariat
in Zambia.
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PART IL
THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE NATIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGlES
Introduction
We have pointed out four conditions for the implementation of the NCSs. These
are:
* The existing governmental agencies must be capable of carrying the
responsibility for the conservation policies. Le. they have to deal with the
environment al probIerns in their sectors, and integrate this with other sectoral
activities.
* Due to the interrelatedness of the environment, agencies have to integrate their
programs across sectorallines.
* The technical and financial resources of the donor community must be mobilized
for the NCSs.
* When implementing NCS programs, the administration in the districts have to
adjust these to local circumstances. The local population must participate,
otherwise needed local resources and comrtment wil not come about.
None of these conditions can be taken for granted. Realizing this fact, policy
makers in both countries have proposed numerous measures in order to make sure
that these conditions are met. The measures may be grouped as follows:
* Resource provision to the involved agencies.
* Hierarchical control measures.
* Education promoting conservationist ways of thinking.
* Dissemination of scientific knowledge and information.
* Setting up coordinating mechanisms.
These measures wil in particular be the responsibility of national environmental
councils in both countries.It remains to be seen whether the measures wil be
implemented. It seems that most of them wil, at least to some extent. Our
objective is to assess what prospects they have to faciltate implementation of the
NCSs, I.e. to ensure that the organisational conditions are met. That assessment
depends on the nature and extent of the problems they address. In the following
chapters we wil first examine why the mentioned conditions are problematic.
Next, we wil review the prospects that the various measures have to overcome
organisational obstacles to implementation.
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7. Organisational challenges
7.1 Governmental agencies and environmental issues
Policy makers in both Zambia and Botswana perceive that environment al
considerations have not been given high priority in the public policies of the two
countries. The large departments which are in charge of the major development
programs, of ten ignore environmental premises. In a review of Botswana' s
environmental probIerns and public policy, Arntzen and Veenendaal state that
concerning arable farming,
Governments efforts are mostly directed at increasing production, and at reducing food
imports. Environmental considerations do not play an explicit role (1986: 77).
As a consequence, major rural development programs in Botswana have turned out
to have adverse environment al effects. One example is the Tribal Grazing Land
Policy, which has accelerated rather than alleviated overgrazing problems in the
country. Another example is the Accelerated Rainfed Arable Program CARAP)
which included a land clearing subsidy. The land clearing had negative
environmental effects in many areas CEskeli 1989, Børhaug 1992).
Zambian development programs also ignore environmental aspects in many cases.
Serious environmental probIerns arise from traditional cultivation techniques when
land become scarce, and the agricultural policy has not addressed these probIerns
CNORAGRIC 1989). The information and production techniques disseminated by
the agricultural extension service do include environmental issues, except some
advice on soil conservation CRawlins 1985). Agricultural policy has promoted
maize production. In several regions climate and soils are not well suited for this
CCMI 1986: 79).
In as far as they are addressed at all, environmental issues are of ten left to small
units with very few resources, and their projects and efforts are consequently too
small and limited. Consider the example of the Forestry Unit in Botswana's
Ministry of Agriculture. The unit is small with very few staff in the fie1d. The unit
has to limit its activities to nurseries, distribution of seedlings and regulation of
c ommerci al logging. Important areas like agro-forestry and communal woodlots
are beyond the capacity of this unit CBørhaug 1992).9
9 Interviews, Gaborone march 1989, march 1992.
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Or consider the example of Zambia's Natural Resources Department. Its overall
task is quite ambitious. The department is responsible for conservation of soil,
water and natural woodlands. It is also in charge of monitoring of the
environment, policy advice on environmental matters, rehabilitation of degraded
resources, and public education campaigns. In its annual report for 1989, it is
stated that hardly any projects were carried out at all, due to lack of manpower,
funds and infrastructure. The only projects carried out were some tree-planting
projects, and one project for replanting of indigenous flora. Furthermore, some of
the few district staff of the department had been able to organise some
conservation construction works CGOZ 1990).
Even small environmentalist units could have had quite some importance if they
were regularly consulted by the larger deparments when programs were being
developed. This happens only sporadically, these small units dedicated to
environmental issues seldom have much influence on the larger sectoral programs
CVeenendaal and Nolefi, undated; Børhaug 1992).
The argument is not that the ignorance is complete, but that seen in relation the
needs pointed out in the NCSs, the priority given to environment al matters in
many key agencies is too limited. Environmental issues are left to understaffed and
underfunded small units. The programs they can handle are too small, and these
units are not inc1uded regularly in the design of larger programs even when these
do affect the environment.
7.2 Cross-sectoral integration
We distinguish between coordination and integration. By coordination is meant the
absence of duplication and conflcting projects and actions. This requires that
agencies inform each other about programs and projects, and that they settle
conflcting plans some way or another. By integration is meant that the projects
and programs of various agencies become complementary parts of a whole. While
coordination is an ambition to avoid that projects undermine each other,
integration is that projects are dependent on each other.
Coordination is repeatedly referred to as a problem in development administration
in Africa CAdamolekun and Muller 1989; Mutahaba 1989). Coordination is of ten
inadequate among sectors, as well as among organisational units within one sector.
In Botswana, the Rural Development Council is an example of a working
coordinating body. Stil, the coordination probIerns are significant. In a sector
study of Botswana' s agricultural sector done for the Ministry of Agriculture some
years ago, measures to coordinate better are suggested to an extreme extent,
indicating that the problem is large indeed CEdwards, Arnani, Frankenberger et aL.
1989).
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However, there are factors facilitating coordination in the case of Botswana. First,
the small size of the administrative apparatus. Second, the spirit of progress that
is very present in Botswana. This spirit creates cornitment and motivates people
to eng age in the quite time consuming task of building and using informal
coordinating networks. The planning cadre system is also important. Planning
Officers in all ministries except Ministry of Agriculture are under the control of
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. The MPDP recruits, trains,
promotes and regularly briefs its cadres, and thus maintains a strong cross-sectoral
network. In addition comes the coordination exercised by the MFDP controlled
planning system CGasper 1990). Under this system all projects need approval from
the MFDP before funds are released, and this approval procedure also inc1udes
whether a given project is within the political guidelines for the plan period. The
governmental system of Botswana thus has a capacity for coordination. However,
as the Wildlife Policy for Botswana ilustrates CGOB 1986b), policies do not
always become integrated even if there is an amount of simple coordination. The
Wildlife Policy strictly addresses wildlife and proposes actions without any
explicit consideration of the needs and opportunities represented by other sectors.
In the case of Zambia, the system is fragmented and poorly coordinated. Mutahaba
argues that this is a long lasting tradition in Zambia, caused by the selective public
policy of the British colonial administration (1989).10 Also Tordoff in his analysis
of the Zambian administration underlines the administrative fragmentation along
sectorallines C1980: 271). There are some formal coordinating mechanisms. There
is an inter-ministerial comrttee for agriculture, fisheries, natural resources, land
and water. It is not functioning regularly. The National Conservation Committee,
which has been in charge of the NCS until 1992, has also served coordination
purposes. These are, however, among the very few coordinating mechanisms of
this kind CNORAGRIC 1989). UNIP may have played a coordinating role in the
past. The dissolution of the UNIP one-party state may in the short run increase
coordination problems.
The characteristics of Botswana that are important to coordination are hardly very
typical for the Zambian system. The NCDP is definitely not as well developed as
its Botswana counterpart, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, and it
does not function equally well as a coordinating mechanism. The administration
is much larger in absolute terrns, and the other factors are also mostly absent. The
Zambian NCS policy document refers to the poor coordination of the whole
governmental machinery, and urges that coordination must be improved CGOZ
1985: 18).
10 The term selective refers to the British policy of investing quite heavily in selected areas of
importance for the mining industry, while leaving other areas almost to themselves. This created
departments with very narrow orientations.
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Jf simple coordination is problematic, cfoss-sectoral integrated programs are even
more so. However, some programs have been framed as cross-sectoral efforts. For
instance the Tribal Grazing Land Policy CTGLP) in Botswana, or the Luangwa
Valley Integrated Resource Development Project in Zambia. In both cases the
programs depended on significant support and interest from the top political
leadership CPicard 1987). Jf integration depends on the presidents active
participation, it wil hardly become a normal way of solving development
probIerns. The need for presidential support rather underlines the exceptionality of
cross-sectoral integration.
7.3 Implementation capacity
The new strategies require more than indirect macro measures and incentives.
They require direct intervention in and interaction with cornunities and resource
users throughout the country. This means that substantial implementation capacity
is needed in the districts. District leve! implementation must involve the local
government system, the local generalist state administration Ci.e. District
Comrssioner/Governor and his administration), the field staff of various sectoral
departments, and tribal administrative units and leaders.
In general, the implementation capacity of all governmental agencies in both
countries is too limited and inadequate. There is hardly any free implementing
capacity in the districts CRawlins 1985; Farrington 1987). New, nation-wide
environmental programs as well as expansion of existing programs wil compete
with other programs for implementation capacity. In both countries, the problems
of high turnover, poorly skilled staff and many vacancies are widespread. The
Zambian situation is particularly problematic when it comes to implementation
capacity CNORAGRIC 1989). Rawlins argues that it is only the agricultural
administration that actually has an apparatus that reaches throughout the whole
country, an apparatus that is hardly characterized by substantial free capacity. The
situation in Botswana is somewhat better, but capacity is scarce also there.11
There are problems of capacity caused by poor infrastructure, i.e. office buildings
and living quarters, transport and office equipment. These problems are far worse
in Zambia than in Botswana. The economic crisis in Zambia has led to drastic
reductions in governmental spending for recurrent expenses. This has also inc1uded
spending for salaries. The government salaries have not kept up with inflation, and
for most of the staff, the monthly payment is not enough to make ends meet. This
forces people to engage in various small scale businesses, and their ordinary job
suffers CMaipose 1984; NORAD 1989; Times of Zambia 10.04.1992).12
11 Most informants in both Botswana and Zambia pointed out the problems of lirnted
implementing capacity (Interviews, March-April 1992).
12 Interviews, civil servants, Lusaka April 1992.
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The under-funding and under-staffng not least hit the local governments. Faced
with scarcity, both Zambia and Botswana have channelled the bulk of resources
to the central government agencies at the expense of local government units
CEgner 1978, 1987; CMI 1986: 16~17; Tordoff 1988, Sikabanze 1990).
The coordination among sectoral agencies at the district level is inadequate in both
countries. In Botswana, the typical pattern is that the staff follow instructions from
their ministerial headquarters. Faced with this, the local coordination structures are
too weak CHughes 1984; Duncan et aL. 1989). The District Comrssioner who
might exercise such a role, is too weaky staffed to fil it. A further complicating
issue is that various ministries organise their sub-national levels in districts and
regions that do not always coincide. On the other hand, District Development
Committees, in which all sectoral ministries are represented, and the District
Development Plans are promising in terrns of coordination, even if they still do
not function adequately CEgner 1987; Gasper 1990). The district staff are organised
in Extension Teams designated to are as within the district. Thus, the mechanisms
exist to some extent, but the resources and the discretion needed to make them
work regularly are often missing.
The situation in Zambia is far worse when it comes to coordination in the districts.
Horizontal relations at that level are characterized by extreme fragmentation and
rivalries CMaipose 1984; Mutahaba 1989; NORGRIC 1989). Compared with
Botswana, the scarcity of resources and infrastructure is larger. The organisations
in question are larger, and thus less easily coordinated by informal mechanisms.
The UNIP control has on one side weakened the administration, while on the other
hand, it has probably resulted in some coordination. This coordinating mechanism
is now gone.
It is required that implementation processes take advantage ofpeople's knowledge
about resources, local circumstances, technology and traditions as these vary
dramatically among areas. The implementation processes have to involve
mobilisation at the local level also for reasons of secUfing input from the local
cornunities. It is necessar to mobilze resources like labour, funding and land
for communal as well as for individual efforts and investments. Furthermore, it is
necessary to mobilize acceptance of sacrifices. The local people have to consent
to abstain from using certain pastures, arable fields, forests and the like in order
to allow their regeneration.
The capacity to adjust programs to local circumstances and interests have in many
cases been low. This is a general problem in most African countries CWunsch and
Olowu 1990). The local circumstances var a lot, are insufficiently know n by
policy makers and are often not recognised. Fortman and Roe ilustrate very well
how policies under these circumstances become irrelevant and inefficient (1985).
They describe how a water development project in Botswana, designed to
construct dams throughout the countryside was based on inadequate understanding
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and knowledge of a whole range of local factors, and consequently failed. These
factors included migration patterns, the various water needs of different groups of
people at different times, forrns of ownership, management systems and access
rules that varied substantially among cornunities, and finally norrns and
economic rationality ca1culations of different groups at different locations. In
Zambia the ecological conditions var at least as much as in Botswana. The
standardized national policies to promote maize cultivation is an example of a
policy not equally efficient and relevant in all communities CNORAGRIC 1989).
7.4 Donor mobilisation
The shortage of resources has been frequently mentioned in the above sections.
Both countries are in need of funds, expertise and skilled manpower if they are
going to succeed with their NCSs.
In particular in Zambia is the dependency on donors severe CSikabanze 1990).
Botswana is in a better position financially, and is able to fund at least parts of the
NCS from domestic sources. But also Botswana needs expertise and funds.
Integrating donors in the national framework of NCS is a challenge. This is a two-
sided issue. First, it is important that donors accept the policies and problem
definitions of the recipient state. Second, it is important that donor contributions
are coordinated. Jf this fails, the strategy wil be undermined. We know from
numerous research works that donors often fail to channel their assistance through
the system and plans of the recipient country CLinné Eriksen 1987). Donors
typically accuse recipients for lack of commitment, slowness and inconsistent
implementation. Most recipients have probIerns to adapt to the speed and precision
of administration expected by donors who are eager to ensure that their money are
well spent CMwanza 1990: 8). In response, donors of ten turn to by-pass strategies.
In Zambia an attempt was made to introduce a comrttee where donors and the
Government could meet and coordinate donor engagements. The system has not
worked properly CCMI 1986: 67-68). In Botswana the situation is better, as the
donors are all channelled through the MFDP.
7.5 Theoretical perspectives
Why do organisations for planning and administration ignore environmental
premises, what leads them to change and to address new problems? Why is
coordination so diffcult? Why are donors attracted to some policy fields and not
to others? Why are implementation structures so often inflexible and incapable of
adjusting to local needs and circumstances? The answers one gives to these
questions depend on what conceptuallenses one applies. The answer we give has
26
implications for the assessment of the measures that are expected to facilitate the
NCSs.
We wil briefly examine a rational perspective, a political perspective and an
institutional perspective on the governmental organisations. These perspectives
inform us about what influences what organisations do and how they interact. We
also need to con sider various views about the conditions for flexible and adapting
implementation.
7.5.1 Organisational change and integration
Rational organisations. In this perspective governmental organisations are
perceived as loyal tools for their superiors, in our case the politicalleadership. The
leadership controls the organisations by means of hierarchy and objectives. Faced
with c1ear and unambiguous objectives, the organisation wil resp ond with loyal
pursuit of these. Resistance from lower levels may be overcome by use of
hierarchical control or by persuasion and rational argument.
For the administrative organisations to respond effectively, resources must be
provided. Staff, funds, expertise, means-end knowledge, legal tools and physical
infrastructure. When new policies and goals are presented to the organisation, it
wil obey and operationalise and implement it, if the necessary resources are
provided and the goals are properly communicated CMorgan 1986; Scott 1992).
The critical problem here is how rational the leadership is, how well it directs and
designs both policies and organisational change.
Political Systems. In this perspective, the assumption of unit y of a governments
goals, interests and power is questioned. The political-administrative system
comprises many actors with partly inconsistent goals and interests, and the actors
are quite loosely linked together. There are few unambiguous and tight hierarchies.
Interests and goals are derived from the ne ed for resources and power, and from
the needs arising from specific tasks and operations in various parts of the larger
system. Actors thus develop their own specific interests and goals. The actors in
the system are individuals or often groups of individuals who have the same
interests, of ten because they belong in the same organisational unit which has
certain interests in the struggle for resources and power CScott 1992).
Policy making, planning and implementation are all processes characterized by
conflct and bargaining. When a new policy is officially decided upon, the new
formal goal is only one of many competing goals. Formal and informal processes
of bargaining, conflct and coalition building may result in changed or modified
actual goals.
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Analyses of African policy makng often draws on the concept of ruling elite. In
some cases, the ruling elite is defined as a very small group of political leaders,
who control the governmental system very c10sely Csee for instance Barkan and
Chege 1989). This approach comes c10se to the rational perspective, by focusing
on the motives, choices and rationalities of the few leaders who direct the whole
system. In other cases, the ruling elite includes also medium level officials and is
a more fluid entity. The focus in many of these analyses is on the processes of
conflict, bargaining and coalition building in this rather large group of
administrative and political elites Csee for instance Picard 1987).
Institutional Perspective. In this perspective, government al organisations are seen
as bodies which act by means of routines. When acting to solve a problem, the
organisations act by choosing one of the available routines. Often, routines that are
only partially suitable have to be chosen because there are no better options
available in the short run.
Routines change slowly. Once a routine is established, the organisation tends to
stick to it until the results achieved by it are no longer acceptable. Developing
routines are costly, and routines are appreciated by those who have developed and
use them, and by those in society who benefit from and feel confident in them.
The institutional perspective sees organisations as dependent on their environment.
They search stable allies and support. However, alles who approve of and support
the organisation and its routines are not always easily found. In recent theory it
has been examined what organisations do when the surroundings do not offer
friendly alles, but instead comprises many actors who have expectations to
processes and substance that the organisation cannot easily meet within its known
routines and preferred tasks CScott 1992). In these circumstances organisations
develop visible formal structures and processes that correspond to expectations in
the environment. Often these. expectations do not suit the organisation, and
informal structures are thus developed, containing the processes and routines
which guide actual operations. This formalism problem is not least known from
African countries.
Introducing new policy objectives to organisations is difficult unless they suit
existing routines and values. Faced with new goals they cannot handle with
existing routines, organisations may resort to resistance, or to formalisrn.
Also this approach has informed students of African policy making. Wunsch and
Olowu C 1990) make it a crucial point in their critique of the African states that the
organisations that belong to the governmental system dispose of a very limited set
of action programs, and that they often do not suit many of the goals that the
Governments pursue. Shortage of material resources, and even more, inadequate
knowledge about the very probIerns and the very society that the organisations
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face make it extremely dernanding to develop new and appropriate action
programmes.
7.5.2 Centralised or decentralised implementation
The debate about how the implementation challenges in Africa should be met,
have of ten centred around the question of centralisation versus decentralisation. It
has been argued in favour of both.
Most African governments have be en strongly influenced by the belief that
centralized controlover planning, program design and implementation is the best
way to trigger off socio-economic development and change. The main arguments
in favour of centralisation has been first, that the scarcity of resources necessitated
centralized control to ensure the most efficient and rational use of them. This also
implied a belief in rational comprehensive planning as a means to achieve
consistent and targeted governmental actions. Second, that centralisation would
ensure national unit y and balanced development among groups and regions. Third,
that local leve! units were too inefficient and had to be strictly controlled.
According to this view, localleve! organisations should be stripped of autonomy,
and turned into tools for the central government. This view of course realizes the
need for strong local administrative units. It argues in favour of strengthening
thern, and in favour of some delegation of routine decisions. But this should be
done very carefully, under close central surveilance (Wunsch and Olowu 1990).
Popular participation is seen as important in this view. Participation is, in addition
to research, pilot projects and systematic data collection, necessary in order to
design good policies that are relevant and effective in the local context. This
design, however, should mainly be the responsibilty of national centralized
institutions. Only the central leve! organisations have the necessary professional
capacity and quality to perform such tasks.
The other view argues that the centralized model has perforrned very badly. Some
even argue that centralisation has a large responsibility for the disappointing
development in Africa since independence. Far-reaching decentralisation is argued
to be more promising in the long run.
The decentralists argue that public policy for development in general depends on
being based on people' s perceptions, interests, needs and probIerns. This does not
rule out centrallevel policy guidelines, but it is needed that policies are adjusted
to local needs in order to be relevant and legitimate. Jf such adjustment takes
place, people are also willng to engage themselves, take on costs and cooperate.
This is particularly important when the problems at hand are not well understood,
and solutions have to be developed in flexible, integrated, locally adjusted ways
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in order to be relevant in the local context (Wunsch and Olowu 1990: 53,61-
64).13
For this to take place when policies originate at the central leve!, central leve1
policy makers need a counterpart at the local leve1 which can represent local
knowledge, preferences and interests, and engage in negotiation and cooperation
with the central state (Mawhood 1974). For 10calleve1 organisations to play this
role, a substantial amount of autonomy is required. Autonomy depends on three
main dimensions.
Local decision making autonomy. Local autonomy is low when local units are
under centralized control by not having the formal powers to dec ide on taxing,
personneI, budget, projects and implementation. In most countries where this is the
case, budgets and projects of local organisations depend on approval at the central
level. PersonneI is hired, trained, evaluated and promoted by the centralleveL.
Being stripped of autonomy and independence, even local governments become
local administrative tools for the central government (Wunsch and Olowu 1990).
Local Interactions. Performance and local problem solving capacity wil be
enhanced if the various governmental and non-governmental actors as well as the
population at large and c1ientele groups cooperate, share information, integrate and
form flexible problem solving networks. Such interactions depend on genuine
popular mobilsation and representation in decision making bodies. Otherwise, the
local people wil seldom enter these processes (Mutizwa-Mangiza 1991).
Career control mechanisms and centralisation within the various functional lines
of command, particularly in sectoral ministries wil cause that the local officials
cannot enter bargaining and cooperation processes locally, nor are they allowed
to adjust policies in such processes. They are made to stick to standard policies
of their home agency. Administrative deconcentration within the sectoral
administrations is thus also needed for such broad problem solving activities to
take place.
In a centralized system, the various units at the locallevel work in isolation from
each other as well as from the local people, with a common exception of sections
of the local elites, and work according to centrally defined and narrow guidelines.
Resources at the Local Level. Resources are needed if 10calleve1 decision making
and interactive problem solving are going to have any meaning. Such resources
13 This implies that the importance of local adjustment varies across sectors. Policies involving
standardised service provisions, and policies that are based on c1ear goals, known means and
standardised solutions may well be centralised in terms of goals and means, like heaIth policy
and possibly primary education policy. These may efficiently be standardised and implemented
in similar ways throughout the country.
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inc1ude staff, skiled and experienced personneI, funding, legal tools, infrastructure
and transport. Furthermore, it requires options to improve the re source supplies.
7.6 Summary
We have examined what kind of organisational problems that the NCSs face.
Exactly how widespread these probIerns are, is difficult to say. But they
sufficiently widespread to make the policy makers aware of them and trying to
address thern. The problems are complex and caused by many factors. These
perspectives are complementary in the sen se that political-administrative systems
function according to complex mixtures of them. We should let us inform by all
of them, thus enriching our analyses. Simple as these perspectives or metaphors
may be, they have far-reaching implications for our assessment of the measures
that are proposed to facilitate the implementation of the NCSs. In the next section,
we wil con sider each of the four main organisational probIerns, and examine the
proposed measures in light of various perspectives.
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8. Facilitating organisational change
8.1 New issues in old line agencies
In chapter 7 it has been shown that the governmental apparatuses in Zambia and
Botswana do not pay sufficient attention to environmental issues. The challenge
seen from an environmentalist point of view is whether and how it is possible to
encourage a change in the priorities and ways of thinking in these agencies.
Several of the proposed measures are clearly relevant in that context.
8.1.1 Information
There is a lack of scientific knowledge and information about the ecological
systems, as well as about how human activities interact with nature. The councils
wil have as a main task to prornote research projects and to monitor the
environmental situation. Furthermore, action wil be taken to compile available
information in data banks so that it wil be accessible. Finally, the councils wil
play the role as disseminators of knowledge and research results. This includes
publishing monitoring reports and research findings, as well as continuous
spreading of information in council meetings. To what extent may an improved
information basis induce changes in governmental agencies' priorities and program
designs?
Information is a necessary basis for any sound environment al policy, and the
usefulness of it is beyond doubt. But as a trigger of change in priorities and
attitudes, its value is less certain. However, the environmental debate has often
been characterized by the belief that if knowledge about the state of the
environment is dissernnated, all relevant parties wil see the obvious need for
action. Baker labels this the awareness trap (1989). It is a trap because information
is hardly ever unambiguous 'stimuli for action. Information is received and
processed by individuals operating in an organisational setting, and most
information can be interpreted in several ways (Tannenbaum and Wildavsky
1984).
Interpretation processes concern not only information, but also goals, management
techniques and guidelines. We wil review these, and then consider further how
interpretation processes in organisations may give unexpected results.
8.1.2 Resource provisions
For a policy to be operationalised and implemented resources of several types are
needed. We may distinguish between technical assistance, staff and infrastructure,
and investment funds. All three types are said to be forthcoming for the agencies
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involved in the NCSs. The question here is whether these wil be applied as
intended, if they wil be used to reach the objectives of the NCSs.
The policy documents strongly recommend a general strengthening of the agencies
that wil plan and implement the NCS policy. To some extent, it is proposed to
direct resources to specific environmental purposes, but it is mainly a general
strengthening of the agencies that is proposed. More staff, better working
conditions, more funds and equipment. 14
Our general argument is that resources are flexible, i.e. they can normally be put
to a number of uses. This point is obvious considering staff and administrative
equipment, and to some extent also funds. However, also technical assistance may
be used for unexpected purposes. Technical assistance wil be provided by the
national environmental councils and their secretariats to interested agencies. It
inc1udes assistance and training in environmental accounting, how environmental
costs of a project may be ca1culated in economic terrns, and how to conduct
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for projects. EIAs are techniques for
assessing the environmental impacts of governmental actions. As most planners
and policy makers have little experience with such assessments, a standard
procedure is developed to be used in planning of programs and projects. The
technical assistance is thus mainly an offer of techniques for planning and
management of public policy.
Introducing new management, planning and monitoring techniques in Africa has
a long history, and the results have of ten been disappointing (Leonard 1987; Reily
1988). New management techniques have often not been based on actual needs,
have been too theoretical, have not been given to those in greatest need, have
often not been followed by posting of trained personneI to where the needs are,
and have often been seen as irrelevant for the actual operations of the agency.
Instead, training and knowledge of management techniques are crucial elements
in the quests for power and advancement within departments and ministries (Reily
1988). Knowledge of new management techniques have been perceived as
irrelevant for the organisational tasks, and have mainly been seen as assets for
promotion and advancement and less as means for improving performance.
These probIerns are not surprising. Seen in a perspective emphasizing competition
and conflct in the governmental system, knowledge, technique and training are
likely to become assets in the competition for resources, advancement and power.
The effects on policy makng and performance becomes a secondary concern. Seen
from an institutional perspective, techniques often does not make sense to the
14 Naturally, the NCSs argue that staff, recurrent funds, equipment and training are to be provided
for the benefit of environmental tasks, and not as a general strengthening of agencies. Our point
is whether it can be controlled what resources such as these are used for.
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agency's problem perceptions and routine actions, and are thus dismissed or
informally put to other uses.
However, provision of administrative resources may be accompanied by conditions
considering what use they should be put to. This is related to hierarchical control
measures, which we wil consider in the next section.
8.1.3 Hierarchical control
Hierarchical control refers to commands and guidelines from superior to
subordinate leveIs. Of particular interest in our discussion are goals decided upon
in political organs, the control exercised by planning ministries, and the authority
and hierarchical control exercised by the environment al councils themselves. These
are all means to infIuence what the governmental agencies do.
The NCS policy documents contain out numerous goals. These are decided upon
in the highest political organs in both countries. These documents also assign
responsibilities for various goals to identified agencies. The NCSs thus represent
official decisions that the governmental apparatuses are obliged to comply with.
Which of ten does not happen exactly as expected. It is common knowledge that
goal formulation are imprecise control mechanisms. They are of ten too general,
too inconsistent and too ambiguous to control action. Furthermore, they may
confIict with other important goals.
Many would argue that facing ignorant governmental agencies, environmental
policy depends on a strong agency cornitted to conservation, which has the
powers to control and direct the performance of other agencies. The national
environmental councils are not equipped with strong powers of this kind. Policy
makers have feared that this would only create intensified conflcts, and prevent
progress. Instead, cooperation and a persuasion have been selected as the strategy
towards other agencies.
However, by bein g in charge of a policy area that not least donors are interested
in, and by having the backing of the central political leadership, the informal
authority of the councils may be significant. The secretariats are small, but the
staff are very dedicated to the environmental policy. They c1early aim at using the
councils, where all important agencies wil be represented, as channels not only
for dissemination of information, but also for building consensus around key
values and goals. Furthermore, education campaigns directed towards government
personneI are planned in both countries. The secretariats wil have sub-units solely
in charge of education campaigns directed towards resource users and government
officials. The form of the NCS documents is also important. They are written with
a strong ideological fIair, forwarding the conservation strategies as comprehensive
doctrines for development and society at large. It c1early aims at establishing a
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new vision, or a new development paradigm that may gradually leave its mark on
the whole system and all its activities. Finally, the relevant agencies have been
activated by the key policy makers during the formulation of the NCSs in the hope
that they wil thus feel some dedication to its principles and basic ideology. All
this contributes to build an informal authority base for the councils, or perhaps
even more, for the council secretariats.
Planning ministries may be powerful control instruments. Botswana' s Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning is an example. All government expenditure
depends on approval in MFDP project by project. The approval criteria include the
financial ceilngs for a given sector, they inc1ude the technical quality of
preparation and planning, and finally, they inc1ude whether a given project is
consistent with policy guidelines (Gasper 1990; Børhaug 1992). This is a powerful
means of control, as it is linked to resource supplies. The Zambian equivalent is
less developed. The National Comrssion of Development Planning and the
Ministry of Finance do not have the same wide powers, neither do they exercise
the same detailed control. Stil, they are means of hierarchical controlover the
government system. Policy makers in both countries have attempted to make the
planning rnnistries their alles and supporters in securing that the NCSs are acted
upon.
The planning agencies, in particular the MFDP in Botswana, have been uncertain
as to the practical use of the environmental policy as a guideline in the planning
process. As pointed out by many authors, environment al principles to be
operational, have to be translated to economic terrns. In Botswana, there has been
done some work to develop National Resource Accounts as well as methodologies
for economic and environmental assessment of projects (Perrings, Gilbert, Pearce
and Harrison 1989; Perrings, Opschoor, Arntzen et aL. 1988). It is reported that
these reports have been met with considerable interest in the MFDP. In Zambia,
IUCN has supported a project in the National Comrssion of Development
Planning for training in environmental economics. The aim has been to develop
routines in the NCDP for applying Environmental Impact Assessments in their
project appraisals. Stil, it remains to be seen how the planning agencies wil apply
these measures and how they wil be adjusted to other premises and values. The
number of possible outcomes is probably significant.
In short, hierarchical control includes the planning system, offcial policy
guidelines and a national council with weak formal powers, but with significant
informal authority. We should note the uncertainty of depending on the planning
system. Environmental premises and goals easily confIict with other goals that are
considered important. The message from the NCS is exactly that policies need to
be changed and adjusted. This probably implies that established interests and
actors in the planning system wil be challenged. Bargaining processes resulting
in adjustment of goals may result. Or seen from the institutionalist perspective; the
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new goals conflct with established problem perceptions and routines. The result
may be reinterpretation processes, where the outcome is uncertain.
Considering all the measures for organisational change, they are quite promising
when seen from a perspective that views organisations as rational machines for
whoever leads thern. In this view, communication of goals, hierarchical
enforcement and control structures, resource provision and training, and
information wil in most cases lead to the intended implementation. However, this
perspective alone cannot capture how the governmental system responds to new
policies and attempts for change. The two other perspectives add valuable insights,
and experiences are of ten consistent with their predictions. We wil consider the
issue of how the governmental agencies may respond in the next section.
8.2 Incentives for change and organisational responses
In as far as governmental agencies function as institutions, we ask how they
perceive and interpret goals, information, training, techniques and control measures
in the light of established ideas about what are important problems and what are
good and realistic solutions. Institutions tend to transform information, goals and
guidelines so that they correspond with existing practices.
The history of decentralisation reforms in Africa provides iluminating examples
of how values and goals of decentralisation permeate the rhetoric and the policy
documents, but stil fail to materialize CRondinell 1981). The experience from
these reforms is not so often open resistance in the administrative system. There
is generally an initial endorsement of the reform principles. Gradually , as the
reforms are implemented, organisational routines and action programs have
influenced the meaning and understanding attributed to the principles, and
gradually the reform is undermined. Not least decentralisation reforms in Zambia
has taken this direction CMutahaba 1989). Similar processes were at work in
Botswana during the planning of the ALDEP and ARAP programs in the early
eighties.15 These programs were responses to changed political guidelines which
gave more attention to the rural poor. The agricultural administration was charged
with the responsibility to launch programs for the poor rural dwellers. However,
both programs became based on already existing problem perceptions and
solutions. These had long been in operation in programs that aimed at the better-
off section of farmers. Consequently, in spite of its official poor people's bias, the
agricultural policy remained adjusted to better off farmers ' problems, because it
was based on routinised solutions that suited this group CBørhaug 1992).
15 ARAP (Accelerated Rainfed Arable Programme) and ALDEP (Arable Lands Development
Programme) were programmes for assisting poor farmers to become commercial farmers in
arable production.
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Another possible outcome is that agencies respond by arguing that they are already
engaged in conservation. The Botswana policy documents state that conservation
is already a national priority for the Government, and has been so since
independence CGOB 1990a: 1-3). It is not unlikely that some agencies in the
system wil think that this statement refers to them.
When faced with changed policy guidelines, line agencies sometimes act tactically
and make only minimal changes in the content of projects, but give it new
headings that are consistent with goal formulations. Toulmin argues that African
governmental agencies are quite good at adopting the terminology that is in vogue
at any particular time, without really taking it too seriously in practical terms
(1991: 35). The NCS background paper about arable farming is said to represent
a new direction for the policy, even if it contains mainly the policies and
principles that have been in operation for many years with mixed results.16 The
paper, which is meant to operationalise the NCS principles in the policy field of
arable agriculture, goes in quite some detail to describe the environment al
probIerns. The NCS principles are strongly endorsed. When it comes to action, the
paper argues first, that principles of increased food production, increased
productivity, diversification of the rural economy and improved technology are
important if sustainable agriculture is to be achieved. This may well be true, the
point is that these are the basic principles that the agricultural policy has built on
for a long time. Second, under the heading of strategies, it lists all the programs
that the Ministry has in operation. There are innovations too, new technological
solutions and some adjustment of programs, but the main line of reasoning is that
the existing policies are environmentally sound. Well known policies, principles
and programs are said to be in line also with the new environmental policy.
Organisations are not always capable of adjusting. One issue is what has been
touche d upon, the slowness of adaption caused by the standard action programs,
and the tendency to prefer these instead of developing new ones. Another issue is
the fact that in particular in Zambia, the governmental structure has degenerated
substantially, due to extremely inadequate funding and party interference. This
affects investments as well as maintenance, but also salaries. The situation now
is that most civil servants have problems making ends meet with their salary.
Officials are forced to engage in various small businesses, and thus their jobs are
not attended to CMaipose, undated).
One may argue that such "starving" agencies will adjust to anything that wil
provide them with desperately needed resources. But it may also be argued that
deteriorating organisations loose the abilty to recover when deterioration goes far
16 Many departments in the Government system produced background papers for their sector as
a contribution to the Nes formulation. In these papers, problems and actions to take are
outIined.
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enough. Weitzel and Jonsson (1989) argue that when an organisation has
deteriorated it is extremely difficult to put it back on track again. The best people
have left, routines are breaking down and the organisation slides into anarchy. It
might be possible only if the leadership is changed, and the organisation
completely transformed. This crisis description seerns to fit well with large parts
of the Zambian governmental system and the prospects for controlled
organisational change are not good.
The Government comprises numerous semi-autonomous actors that compete for
resources, power and prestige. New goals, information and resources are
understood in terrns of their possible effects on distributions of power and
resources. The NCSs may be changed in processes of bargaining and conflct.
Another possible outcome is ilustrated by the experience of Botswana' sTribal
Grazing Land Reform, launched in the mid 1970' s. The background for this land
reform in the livestock sector was that the Government had pursued an
expansionist policy for a long time, without due regard to the environmental
consequences of letting livestock expand into increasingly fragile areas. In the end,
the degradation of the grazing land had become so severe that a major
environmental program was needed to rehabilitate the range and to introduce
improved resource management systems, and TGLP was initiated. The members
of the ruling elite iii Botswana took a strong interest iii the program, among others
because many of them were large cattle owners. They forrned a strong coalition
that overruled the opposition from lower leve! bureaucrats and expatriate advisors.
They gradually adjusted the program to their own needs for further control of land.
Gradually , the environmental aspects of the program disappeared, and what came
out in the end was another livestock expansion program, favouring the few
wealthy cattle owners CParson 1981; Picard 1987).
In the politicalperspective, even if the governmental agencies assume the new
policy ideas, they may do so while at the same time continue with what they are
already doing. This is due to the loose coupling among the parts in the system,
makng it possible for two units to pursue opposing objectives. Environment may
be just another portfolio, while the previous policies are maintained,
environmentally sound or not. Again ARAP provides us with an example. One
unit of the Ministry of Agriculture in charge of the ARAP program subsidized
large scale land clearing, while other actors tried to encourage tree-planting in the
farming cornunities CBørhaug 1992).
In short, we have argued that in loosely coupled systems comprising actors with
differing interests and values, these interests often conflict with and prevail over
new policy goals. But there may also be actors who see it as being in their interest
to respond to new policy goals. First, there wil most likely be some actors who
share the new values and policy principles. Second, there may be actors who
should rather be described as somewhat opportuiiistic in terrns of policy values,
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but who are interested in resources, status and prestige to their organisational unit,
or even to themselves. In as far as they are relatively autonomous, initiatives like
the NCSs may offer opportunities. Dresang describes the Zambian system as one
which is gradually breaking apart, where hierarchical control is weak (1975).
There are few resources to support action, and officials receive rather few
programs and initiatives from superiors. Their autonomy is greatly enhanced by
this. There is thus a room for administrative entrepreneurship, that is, autonomous
actors may resp ond with proposals in line with the new policy on their own
initiative, often without going through established hierarchies.
Formal goals do not stimulate system responses, nor organisational responses, but
responses from entrepreneurs located in organisations that do not use them very
much. What stirnulate these entrepreneurs, are the prospects for funding beyond
what governments normally offer, prospects for accelerated advancement due to
extraordinary achievements, and extra personal benefits. These prospects are
particularly bright when donors are involved. As Dresang argues, the achievements
of such entrepreneurs may be significant also in terms of policy objectives. The
problem is that it is difficult to predict where such entrepreneurs wil appear, what
they wil want to do and how it fits the policy framework in general.
Considering the NCSs, it is too early to assess the extent and direction of
processes like these. Still, there are some puzzling indications. The Zambian NCS
has broad objectives covering most sectors, not least the rural development sector.
In as far as preparations could be interpreted by the time of data collection, there
was a noteworthy bi as to give priority to pollution control. Which is definitely
needed, but it is stil only one of many objectives of the NCS. The pollution
control Inspectorate was already operational. People were already hired to inspect
production sites, cooperation with the industry was initiated, and infrastructure Ci.e
laboratories etc) was already in place. The Natural Resources Inspectorate was not
operational, few observers had any c1ear idea about what this inspectorate should
do and when. Concerning policy issues within forestry, wildlife, agriculture and
land use planning, some observers had problems to point out any preparation and
forthcoming action at all. Some of them frankly stated that they did not expect
much action and implementation in the near future Clnterviews, Lusaka april 1992).
It may be that the organisations who could gain more resources through priority
topollution control have won some bargaining process, and thus captured the bulk
of available resources. Or it may be that this was an area where the routines and
structures already existed to some extent (laboratories and pollution control
experts). In that case, it was easy to link existing practices to new goals and
policies. It may be that an actor acted like an entrepreneur, and moved quickly in
order to get started with pollution control. Another issue is the mentioned tendency
in Botswana to leave the country's largest environmental problem, overgrazing,
untouched. The explanation may be the interests and power of key actors in the
system. Or that established problem perceptions and routines have prove d resistant,
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and instead of being shaped by the new environment al policy, the latter is shaped
by thern.
According to observers, there are also encouraging signs in Botswana. In several
major road construction projects, EIAs have been conducted, and in one major
case at least, this exercise led to substantial changes in the project design. The
same observers, however, note that in practical action, it is difficult to eng age the
agricultural administration, and the latest NDP for Botswana was a disappointment
to many Clnterviews, Gaborone march-april1992). The problem, they argue, is that
the officials are sceptical to let environmental issues interfere in projects designed
to increase productionand productivity in agriculture.
In surnary, it is likely that changes wil come about as a result of the proposed
measures. However, the actual content and direction of these changes are difficult
to predict. They may or may not be beneficial to the environment. The latest NDP
of Botswana does include projects that are in line with the new NCS principles.
Projects in fisheries and forestry are promising. As recommended by the NCS,
untapped resources should be more fully utilized, and these projects reflect that
goal. It is most likely easier to add new sub-sectors and policies than to change
old ones.
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9. Organisational integration
The NCSs envision close integration and coordination in the program and project
design, and in the implementation processes. We distinguish between coordination
and integration, by understanding coordination as the absence of duplication and
conflicting projects and actions. By integration is meant that the projects and plans
of various agencies are complementary parts of a whole.
Several measures have been proposed to increase coordination. The efforts
mentioned in the above, i.e. information, education, policy guidelines and resource
provision are expected to increase integration because they wil reveal the need for
it. The uncertainty related to these measures apply also to the question of
integration. They may lead the offcials to see the need for integration. But
officials may also be guided by bureaucratic interests and struggles for power, or
by routines and standard actions, to conc1ude that integration can be ignored.
The establishment of the national environmental councils, with high level
representation from most ministries, research institutions and NGOs is perhaps the
most crucial innovation concerning coordination and integration. These councils
wiI be quite autonomous and they wil not be under the hierarchical control of
other agencies or bodies. The environmental councils wil have many tasks. They
are expected to initiate projects and programs, to improve coordination by
facilitating exchange of information, they wil monitor the environmental situation,
they are expected to faciltate integrated action when multi-sectoral probIerns arise,
they are supposed to be fora for advice and education, and they should develop
the NCS policies further.
There are few material or hierarchical incenti ves for genuinely cross-sectoral
projects, for instance guidelines for resource allocation that signalize priority to
integrated instead of sectoral environmental projects. This means that the extent
of integration depends on the processes that wil take place when agencies meet
in the councils. A key question is what role the council secretariats wil play. They
are in both countries dominated by the environmentalists who have been driving
forces in the NCS formation processes, and they have in the councils an unique
opportunity to set policy development and program designs in motion.
What are the conditions for organisational cooperation, be it coordination or
integration? According to the rational organisation perspective, the crucial issue
wil be whether cooperation improves goal realisation. Jf it is perceived that it
does, then provision of meeting places wil facilitate cooperation greatly. As we
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have elaborated on above, this perspective does not capture all important features
of the processes that shapes practical policy.
According to the institutional view, organisations avoid uncertainty. They avoid
the grey zones between organisational domains where few routines exist. In these
areas conflct, tension and uncertainty easily arise. Most agencies wil therefore
be reluctant, and at best eng age in marginal cross-sectoral efforts. They may
realize the need to work across sectors if this is what is required in their
environment, but they wil try to keep most of their activities outside the grey
zones between organisations.
However, drawing on an institutional perspective, Beck Jørgensen (1977) refers
to research suggesting that if inter-organisational cooperation do get off the
ground, whatever the intentions and functions in the short term, in a longer time
perspective, may facilitate the development of common values and perspectives.
The organisations may, influenced by these values, gradually come to pursue
policies that are more in line. This may mean that policies may gradually become
more consistent and oriented towards increasingly similar goals. This may in turn
intensify cooperation. The environmental Councils may have exactly this function;
over time to expose the representatives of governmental agencies to certain values
and perspectives.
The council secretariats may themselves become institutions, not least because
they are permanent bodies with legal powers, and with a permanent staff that may
act on their own. Even if their proposed role is mainly to coordinate and facilitate
the implementation of the NCSs, they may gradually take on larger responsibilities
that the other agencies are not able to shoulder. They may become the main
vehicle for environmental policies. Not least if donors perceive that assistance wil
be most efficiently spent if it is channelled to the council secretariats, by-passing
other agencies. If the secretariats do become such main actors, how wil they cope
with integration probIerns? The formal organizing of the secretariats is based on
conventional lines, as outlined in chapter 6. Specialisation in the Botswana
secretariat follow mainly standard functional divisions, and even if the secretariats
are small and capable of integrating by informal means, these formal structuring
is not particularly promising. Most likely, the conventional division of work is
chosen to fit the division of tasks in the governmental structure and in order to
facilitate engagement of many donors, i.e. to construct one counterpart for each
donor. That may be effective, but it does not prornote integrated policy makng.
In the political view, the councils are arenas where the actors meet. The actors
may use the arena in various ways, according to the rules of the game that are
established, and what interests they pursue. The secretariats of the councils wil
be actors along with many other actors, pursuing their own interests. The agencies
that are involved in the environmental policy field may benefit from cooperation
for other reasons than the ambition to integrate their programs. By pulling together
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under the umbrella of a national policy and a national council, that they wil after
all partly control themselves, they wil create an image of dedication, coordination
and efficient joint action. Such an image may be instrumental for acquiring larger
resources. What realities that are to be found behind the image is another matter.
Inter-organisational cooperation may have informal functions. It is a way to be
informed about what is going on and to receive information. African governmental
systems are systems where information is a scarce resource. Councils are
obviously important for receiving information. Participation in the council may be
a way to spread responsibilities for failng to act effectively and to postpone
action. Hil (1979) argues in a study from Tanzania that government officials
consciously created and increased such confusion and unclear responsibilties as
this protected against criticism and allowed freedom of action. It is quite possible
that the governmental agencies wil cooperate, but the motives, contents and
outcome may be surprisingly different from those envisioned.
Donors may dernand and facilitate integration in the projects in which they
activate themselves. Often cross-sectoral programs in Africa are donor projects,
like the Luangwa Valley Integrated Resource Management Project in Zambia. The
many IRDPs (Integrated Rural Development Programs) throughout Africa are also
pertinent examples. This, however do es not create stable, general conditions for
such integration outside the donor funded projects.
It is still too early to reach conc1usions about the extent and depth of cross-
sectoral cooperation. Mainly based on theory, we have argued that cooperation is
indeed difficult, and it may not come about in the magnitude that the NCSs seem
to envision.
Some data from Botswana suggest that multi-sectoral efforts, apart from those
initiated by donors,. are only of an experimental nature, and rather marginaL. The
agencies seem to wish to retain controlover their main programs. However,
experimental, specialized pilot projects of cross-sectoral nature seem possible. For
instance in the background documents about the contributions of the livestock
sector and the arab1e agriculture sector of Botswana, a few ideas of cooperation
in research and pilot projects with the wildlife sector are suggested. Compared to
the visions of the NCS policy documents the suggestions are modest, but stil
positive. On the other hand, in the latest National Development Plan for Botswana,
the review of agricultural projects contain hardly any multi-sectoral projects. The
next plan wil giv e a more solid basis to judge about this. Concerning Zambia,
most NCS projects remain sectoral this far.17
17 IUCN, Zambia has made an overview of NCS projects commenced, which supports this
impression.
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The problems of poor coordination and integration in public policy are well
known, and hard to overcome. Still, it remains that lack of such integration is a
serious obstacle to solving environmental problems. The most frequently
mentioned problem is that the ecological systems are themselves interconnected,
and ignorant of sectoral divisions. They should thus be addressed in an integrated
manner. As Asmeron reminds us, also the exploitation systems are integrated
(1991: 18).The typical resource user in the African country side exploits a whole
range of natural resources in integrated and complex survival strategies. A sectoral
environment al policy means that this production system, is unevenly approached
and thus disturbed. Asmeron also points out that if the environmental challenge
is left to sectoral policy making, only the problems c10sely related to the
established sectoral activities wil be addressed. Those parts of the environmental
problems that do not have immediate relevance for any sectoral responsibility wil
be left unattended. Baker notes that when complex and integrated environmental
problem are disaggregated by sectorisation, many of the basic forces and causes
of the problems disappear from our view. The result is that policies wil tend to
address symptoms, not causes (1989).
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10. Field implementation
The implementation of the NCSs depend on local integration among the various
sectoral fie1d agencies, the sub-national generalist administration and local
governments. Because the environmental probIerns are interrelated across
functional lines, these lines have to be crossed in an integrated manner. It is to
these sub-national units that the other requirements are directed as well. It is
required that implementation processes take advantage of people's knowledge
about resources, local circumstances, technology and traditions. The
implementation processes have to involve mobilsation at the local level also for
reasons of securing input from the local communities. It is necessary to mobilize
resources like labour, funding and land for cornunal as well as for individual
efforts and investments. Furthermore, it is necessar to mobilize acceptance of
sacrifices.18
What are the prospects for achieving such local level performance in Botswana
and Zambia? In short, policy makers have suggested to strengthen the existing
system. It is suggested to hire more staff, train them better, improve working
conditions and provide more resources. Advice and technical assistance are also
proposed. Concerning local integration, it is proposed in Zambia to assign
coordinating environmental officers at sub-national leveIs, and in both countries
is it proposed to set up coordinating committees. These measures are obviously
needed. Our question here is whether they wil faciltate the type of
implementation processes envisioned. To strengthen the existing systems means
to stick to a centralisation strategy as the systems in both countries are relatively
centralized. We wil first consider centralizing characteristics of Botswana and
Zambia, and next discuss the prospects for centralisation in the field of
environmental policies.
Centralisation is that the state diminishes the decision making autonomy of local
level organisations, that it does not provide the necessary resources for autonomy
to be meaningful, and that it prevents the formation ofbroad local problem solving
networks. Such networks should include government agencies, NGOs and people's
representatives. On all three dimension of centralisation, Zambia and Botswana
both have to be portrayed as centralized structures. In both countries popular
participation is restricted. In Botswana, the tradition of consultation in the kgotla
18 The local people may have to consent to abstain from using certain pastures, arable fields,
forests and the like in order to allow their regeneration as weIl as improved management of
them. In the short run, this wil be a sacrifice.
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is of ten referred to as a ipain vehicle for direct consultation and democracy.
However, as the case of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy in the early seventies
ilustrates, the kgotla meetings, that all citizens of the vilage may attend to voice
their opinions to government officials, serve more as top..down information and
propaganda channels and less as true democratic arenas CParson 1981). The district
councils are elected in free elections and represent the element of indirect
democratic participation. These councils suffer from poorly educated and trained
councilors, and the power left to them is quite restricted. Picard has argued that
one reason why the elected district councils are allowed to function, and even
voice some criticism is that the opinions and actions of these councils are very
weaky connected to actual policy making CPicard 1979).
In Zambia, the elements of popular participation have deteriorated after the
reforms of 1980, after which UNIP seized firm controlover the councils CMijere
1985). As UNIP experienced an increasing crisis of legitimacy and support, the
democratic character of the representative elements of the system vanished even
further CMaipose undated). People increasingly became quite ignorant of local
political participation. However, the whole system of local government is now
under consideration and district councils elected under conditions of party
competition may improve the situation.
The extent of local autonomy is low in both countries. Concerning Botswana,
Egner has argued strongly that the local government in Botswana is formally very
much controlled by the central ministries, in particular the Ministry of Local
Government and Lands CMLGL). Projects, plans, funding and personneI matters
are all firrny under the capita!' s control. Furthermore, he argues that in formal
controIs, like the MLGL' s application of approval procedures, budgeting routines
and fund releases reduces local autonomy even further (1987). As for Zambia,
Maipose (1984) describes the local government system as extremely under-funded,
like most of the Zambian bureaucracy. He further argues that local autonomy is
constrained by a number of factors. First, general central control out of fear of
opposition and incompetence. He also notes that Zambia' s many huge, resource
dernanding national initiatives and special programs effectively have taken alllocal
level implementation capacity, and left ordinary tasks largely unattended.
Botswana has to some extent experienced similar probIerns CFarrington 1987;
Børhaug 1992). The shortage of resources in Zambia has grown worse in recent
years, and lay-offs are probably unavoidable CMaipose undated; Times of Zambia
10.04.92). Maipose describes the Zambian local government al system as centrally
controlled. PersonneI, spending, projects and taxing; all depends on centrallevel
approval Cundated: 32-33). Even if the reforms of 1980 explicitly aimed at
increased autonomy for the District Councils, control remained in the ministerial
offices in Lusaka CMutahaba 1989).
Centralized policy implementation may work relatively well, if the knowledge
basis for the policy is good, if local variation is limited, and if the centre can
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provide the resources needed to maintain and control a professional, effective
bureaucracy that penetrates the whole country. Jf not, centralisation means that
adjustment to local priorities, preferences and circumstances is difficult CWunsch
and Olowu 1990). In as far as ecological, social and economic conditions var
substantially standardized policies wil turn out to be irrelevant or damaging in
some districts, as we have ilustrated in section 7.3.
The effects of centralisation on development policy in general and on
environmental policy in particular have been studied extensively, and the
conc1usions suggest that centralisation is not well suited to guide implementation
of environmental policies in the fieId. The variation and the lack of knowledge is
too great CWunsch and Olowu 1990). In some cases, centralized policies become
irrelevant and inefficient in the local context. In other cases, the same poor
adjustment to local conditions make policies even damaging. Baxter refers to
research showing how development projects for dairy processing and pastoral
production were based on inadequate knowledge of local circumstances and
therefore turned out to be damaging to the target groups' adaptive capacities and
later led them into serious probIerns (1991).
Based on successful resource management projects, Drijver strongly argues that
people wil only play their part and provide needed input and support if they are
motivated, which they wil be only if they are asked to in volve themselves in
solving felt problems (1991). The systems of management and regulations have
to be adjusted to the local traditions and institutional forms in order to be
legitimate and understood CBaxter 1991). Implementation has to leave much
discretion to the local communities themselves, while at the same time the local
processes have to be watched to prevent local power abuses.
When a policy addresses problems and opportunities that are only partly
understood, where goals and means relations are unclear and where circumstances
vary greatly, centralized policies wil, if they are implemented as such, be
problematic. In section 7.3 we have presented research showing this kind of
probIerns in Zambia and Botswana. Centralisation is a key explanation for these
problems. However, experience shows that many governments in Africa do not
have the capabilty to go completely through with centralized policies CMawhood
1974; Stah11990; Toulmin 1991). As noted, 10calleveI organisations under central
control are often severely understaffed and inadequately funded. Their abilty to
implement policies effectively is low, also when acting as administrators of central
leveI programs and projects. Peasants have the option of withdrawing from
interaction with the state if policies are not relevant or seen as profitable for thern.
The local branches of the state have quite small options to reach them.
These factors mean that the state is unable to penetrate the country effectively, and
the consequences of this are serious when the state is not willng to leave it to the
local people and their organisations either. It means that the state is unreliable. In
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locallevel implementation, the centrallevel often has the logistical responsibility.
Le. providing items needed as inputs, providing transport and adequate storage for
such items and providing needed infrastructure. Furthermore, the administrative
logistic is also often in the hands of the centre. This includes releasing funds in
time and approving applications of various sorts without delay. The central
government is not always capable of doing this properly, projects often stop
lialfway in t1iirimplementation. Iffias serious consequences fõffie target groups,
if in the middle of a project, the supplies are not there in time CHowelI 1985;
Asmeron 1991; Baxter 1991). Even Botswana has experienced probIerns of this
type CRashem 1987).
The central state may act in ways that become destructive by being only partially
implemented. Toulmiii (1991) describes this very clearly. Land tenure is, since
colonial times, formally in the hands of the state. Traditionallocal tenure systems
have no formal status and is thus unreliable to people, as it may be overruled by
central government intervention at any time. The state, on the other hand, while
being able to intervene from time to time, is not able to fully substitute traditional
systems. Often its capacity is so restrained that it only manages to undermine the
predictabilty of traditional systems by iiitervening arbitrarily. This leads to
uncertainty. The probIerns experienced with Botswana Land Boards bear some
similarity to this description. With experiences like these, it is no wonder that
there are reports of people having attitudes of open hostility to state intervention
in environmental management. An example is that fores ters who have regulatory
powers are feared, and thus unable to engage in cooperation with local
cornunities CMatiko 1990). Skepticism among the local people towards state
intervention is reported, the NCS documents of Zambia report that Fishery
Officers, who have some regulatory powers, are feared and avoided to such an
extent that it is impossible for them to provide services based on voluntary
cooperation with the fishermen CGOZ 1985).
The full implementatioii of the NCS lies ahead, and the above sections only
identify possible problems. But there are data showing that the concerns about
centralized implementation principles are justified. In Zambia, it was attempted to
launch sub-national conservation strategies a few years ago. The project had donor
support, and ai med at producing sub-national plans, priorities and projects based
on local consultation, local circumstances and local priorities. The district councils
proved unable to follow up. No plans were ever completed, the whole exercise
was a failure. One observer stated that the whole thing was a blind track as the
local authorities were completely unable to take on such a task. If they really are,
the NCS implemeiitation is likely to meet problems very quickly. Because it is this
inability to act locally which is the problem, and centralisation is an important
explanation for these problems.
In the case of Botswana, Duncan and Egner note that there is not capacity, local
autonomy and coordination in the districts to handle the forthcoming NCS (1989).
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Their concerns are confirmed by some other data as well. When the NCS process
was set in motion, there was considerable interest in the districts for the NCS.19
The districts in particular endorsed a proposal to set up an independent trust that
would provide resources and expertise to the districts in their attempts to deal with
the environmental problems. Such a trust could have provided resources, autonomy
and a focal point for joint local action. However, this solution was turned down
by the Government because it would give too much autonomous disposal of
resources to the districts. Not surprisingly, after this, interests in the districts faded
away.
19 Interview, Gaborone March-April 1992.
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11. Attraeting donors
In order to attract donors to a policy field, the field and the concepts used to
describe it must be at least to some extent consistent with donor policies at the
time. In spite of the ambition of many donors to adhere to the priorities of the
recipient country, the donor agencies tend to follow their own policy guidelines
as to what to give priority.
Several donors, not least the Scandinavian donors, see environmental issues as a
priority and are eager to assist. Donor interests are in fact partly the reason for the
ambitious plans for environmental policy in Botswana and Zambia. Toulmin
argues that both the National Conservation Strategies as well as other similar
national plans are responses to donor initiatives (1991: 28). The Zambian policy
makers argue that conservation measures in public policy is a promising means to
attract donors CGOZ 1985: 66). Although detailed data are missing, it seems that
policy makers in the two countries take considerable donor support for granted,
and italso seerns that several donors are indeed prepared to support. The environ-
mental policy initiatives of the two countries are launched in the form of a wide
policy framework which is given quite some publicity. This way of initiating a
policy means that it is very visible, and may be functional for attracting donors
who are not always well aware of what goes on in the various government offices.
Another critical condition is that the donor can identify a suitable counterpart in
the recipient government. A problem for environment al projects has been that they
have suffered from a weak organisational base. The responsible deparments have
been too small, with too few powers and personneI, and with very weak links to
policy makers in other sectors CBaker 1989). The NCS linking departments and
ministries in a national high ranking Council, promises that there wil be much
clearer and more unified structures to deal with on the recipient side. The Councils
and their secretariats wil have a delegated responsibility to coordinate donor
engagement in environmental projects. Furthermore, the secretariats of the
Councils wil be very specialized. One government offcial said that one important
reason for specializing, was exactly that it would facilitate donor engagement.
Each donor may then have a counterpart that wil deal only with one donor. Thus
donor rivalries and conflicts can be avoided.
Another aspect is the issue of donors ' confidence in their counterparts, i.e. their
ability to come up with reports, accounts and applications as agreed, and whether
they can be trusted to implement timelyand efficiently. If this confidence is
missing, donors often resort to by-pass strategies. It is the explicit ambition of
both NCSs to avoid this, and to ensure that donor engagement results in the
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development of competence and experience in the governmental administration.
The Government of Botswana in general has quite a good reputation, while the
Zambian record is more mixed. By having developed a new organisational set-up,
parts of which wil be allowed more generous salaries and working conditions than
ordinary governmental standards, it may well be that donors wil have more confi-
dence in the structure, and wil be more wiling to operate in close cooperation
with it.
It thus seerns that the organizing of the NCSs wil facilitate donor supplies of
needed resources. The core issue here is that there is a donor interest, and that the
recipient country is able to adjust to and exploit these interests. Organisational
means are important in this respect. In fact, Botswana officials have expressed the
view that donors have turned to environmental problems to such an extent that it
is becoming a problem. Other sectors suffer, and the coordination tasks is be-
coming huge indeed. However, it has taken a lot of time and many delays before
the NCSs became operational. There are indications that donors are becoming in-
creasingly uncertain as regards whether the NCSs are the best framework for the
assistance. Donors wil not necessarily channel their contribution to the NCS
framework.
But a key ambition is that the councils should coordinate the donor contribution
into the NCS framework. Uncoordinated donor contributions have long created
probIerns for development policies in many African countries. Coordinating donors
is not an easy task. An attempt to establish a donor coordination council in
Zambia in the mid-eighties failed because the administrative resources needed for
it were not provided CCMI 1986). Difficulties in coordinating donors relate also
to the unwilingness of donors themselves. Donors are positive to coordination, but
not to be coordinated CWhittington and Calhoun 1988). Firm recipient coordination
reduces the freedom of action for the donors. Coordination would also bring con-
flcts among donorS to the surface, as they operate with different principles and
procedures. Such conflcts they try to avoid. Donor coordination is costly also for
the donor. It takes time and money, in particular as many donors' country represen-
tations have limited delegated powers. Finally, donors are not always very con-
fident in the quality of recipient coordination. This is particularly true in countries
with relatively unreliable administrative systems, like the case of Zambia. Donors
do not necessarily have an interest in coordination. It may be good for the national
development policies, but seen from a strictly project oriented perspective, such
coordination quickly becomes an obstacle and a constraint.
Several project proposals in the NCS documents have already been endorsed by
donors, and implemented as donor projects. This indicates that donors are
interested indeed. On the other hand, these projects were launched without waiting
for the establishment of the councils and without waiting for the final decision to
launch the NCSs. To integrate donor contributions in the national policy might be
more difficult than to get thern.
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12. Summary and concluding remarks
The objective of this study was to identify and analyze some critical organisational
preconditions for the implementation of the National Conservation Strategies of
Botswana and Zambia. We identified four important preconditions, namely that the
governmental agencies are capable and wiling to take on a major responsibilty
for new environmental tasks, and that they adjust existing programs to the new
policy principles. Next, that they integrate their activities across sectors. Third, that
implementation in the fie1d is flexible and mobilizing. Finally, that substantial
donor support is mobilized and integrated in the strategies.
As policy makers have realized, these conditions are not easily fulfiled. The NCSs
thus propose a range of measures aimed at facilitating and encouraging
organisational change adjusted to these preconditions. We have seen that the
prospects of these measures to succeed are at best uncertain, with exception of
donor mobilisation. It seems that the two governments quite skilfully have adjusted
to donor preferences, and donor support thus seems likely.
Considering the measures for improving agency performance and inter-agency
relations, a recurrent theme in our analysis has been that the NCSs quite likely
wil induce organisational changes, but it is very uncertain what kind of changes,
and some wil be unexpected - at least to outside observers. We have also
referred to research indicating that changes may turn out to be quite superficial.
Concerning implementation in the fie1d, the NCSs present few solutions to the
challenges they pose. Standardized, top-down programs may be advantageous in
certain sectors, but with regard to environmental policy they are quite problematic.
Critical organisational conditions for the NCSs are thus uncertain or even partly
absent. It is therefore not very likely that all the actions proposed by the NCSs
wil be put into practical action as the policy documents outline them. The key
problems are that governmental systems are difficult to change intentionally, and
that centralized policies run the risk of being irrelevant or even damaging in the
districts.
These probIerns are relevant not only for the NCSs of Botswana and Zambia. The
environmental probIerns are addressed in similar ways in many countries in Africa.
IUCN has promoted and supported the development of such strategies in
approximately 50 countries, many of them in Africa CIUCN, UNEP and WWF
1991: 1). IUCN paricipates in both the development and implementation of NCSs,
and has permanent offices in many countries, included Zambia and Botswana. It
is very likely that at least in Less Developed Countries, in which environmental
52
~ .-
policy is a new field, IUCN influences very strongly how the strategies should be
developed and implemented. The organisation has done so in the cases of
Botswana and Zambia. The NCSs of these two countries correspond very closely
with the model for strategy development and implementation that is put forward
in IUCN's overall strategy document, the World Conservation Strategy CIUCN
1980). This model has obviously guided and shaped the NCSs of Botswana and
Zambia, and probably also in the NCSs of other African countries where the IUCN
has been involved. The question of what prospects this approach of comprehensive
national strategies has in the field of environmental policies is thus a matter of
significant interest also beyond Zambia and Botswana.
The IUCN approach offers many advantages, and is c1early attractive to those who
wish to see quick and comprehensive action taken to address the environmental
problems. It deals with many problems in integrated ways, it sets up goals and
promotes prompt action. Its weakness is that it over-estimates how quickly,
effectively and controlled we can change the very mode of functioning of a
governmental apparatus, and that it over-estimates the governments' capability to
reach the districts with relevant and effective public policy. The actual outcome
in practical action wil most likely be different from what is envisaged in the
NCSs. The strategies wil be trans forme d and partially ignored in the process in
which the NCSs meet the interests, values, routines, re source shortages and weak
implementation capacity of the governmental systems.
Seen in a traditional perspective on policy making and implementation, these
problems make the IUCN approach a not very promising one. The traditional and
conventional approach to strategies and their implementation is that the given
goals should be realized by the effectuation of the defined means of organisation,
procedures, resource use and legal instruments. Compliance with the strategy and
the means it defines is the key norm. If this compliance is not forthcoming, this
is defined as the crucial implementation problem that should be addressed. The
conditions for compliance are that goals have to be c1ear, consistent and c1early
cornunicated, the implementing agencies must have sufficient capacity and the
right type of capacity, the active support and endorsement of the policy must be
developed among the implementors, the policy itself must be based on relevant
means-ends knowledge, policy makers must have some means to control the
implementing agency and finally, the implementing agencies must handle powerful
actors in the environment who wish to alter the policy. These causes of the
probIerns can be corrected by the resp on si ble superior officials in charge of
implementation. They may improve goal c1arity, communication, provide more
resources, increase monitoring and control, and they may persuade and educate the
implementors to accept the policies (Ham and Hil 1984).
This line of reasoning has been very influential in studies of implementation
processes in African countries. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) are quite
representative when they discuss the failures of decentralisation programs in this
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perspective. They argue that implementation of such programs depends on clear
and realistic goals, c1ear and correct means-ends knowledge, sufficient resources,
technical assistance to the implementing agencies, c1ear and detailed action
programs, c1early defined division of responsibility, systematic evaluation, control,
monitoring and coordination exercised by the centrallevel policy makers, and
promotion of the necessary attitudes among those whose cooperation is necessar.
All these factors failed in the cases they reviewed. They thus argue that these
causes have to be corrected by the responsible officiaIs.
However, implementation is hardly ever characterized by strict compliance if the
task at hand is complex and affected by contextual and organisational variables
that are only partly known, controlled, and predictable. Which is often the case,
not least in African contexts. Implementation strictly directed by a policy
document may be desirable. But it is seldom possible, and it is therefore not a
very constructive prescription for how implementation should be done and how we
should evaluate it CHam and Hil 1984; Offerdal 1993).
An alternative view recognises that implementation of a policy normally involves
adjustments, transformations and surprising developments. Policy makng continues
well into the implementation process. The offcial decision makers are only one
group of decision makers, the implementors are equally important.2o The system
is not a centrally controlled machine, but composed of many actors with differing
interests, as well as differing routinised problem perceptions, values and goals. In
order to influence practical policy in the short run, one must start by analyzing
what the actors actually do. What probIerns they see, what interests they have, and
what actually influences their decisions must be the point of departure. Based on
such insights, one may cooperate with them with the aim of improving their
problem solving, and to some extent, develop their problem understanding CHam
and Hil 1984).
Recognizing the autonomy and differing interests and routines of the many actors
in the governmental system do es not mean that policies are produced in an
anarchy where the many actors do as they please. There is a collective level as
well, the system in general or an organisation have common goals, values and
perceptions that are accepted by all as constraints on and guidelines for individual
behaviour. These collective goals are not synonymous with offcial formal goals,
but they may be influenced by offcial goals. They are also influenced by symbolic
politics. Le. expressions of commitment to certain values that may over time be
widely accepted as legitimate goals and constraints on behaviour. Finally, they are
influenced by the experiences of the individual actors in the system. Organisations
20 The implementors are both the field level officiaIs, who interact with target groups, and the
officials of various agencies in the capital, who receive a policy from other organs in order to
operationalise and communicate it to the field staff.
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learn and develop changed goals and values when somebody in the system has
made experiences and learnt something. Such actor experiences may influence
collective goals, values and routines in the organisation at large.
Such learning occurs not least during implementation COfferdal 1993). In many
cases, this learning process is very valuable. It facilitates necessary adjustments,
and it develops indigenous knowledge and experience in the governmental system.
The designers of a plan or a policy naturally have only quite general control and
influence on these processes.
What are the prospects for the NCSs seen in this perspective? Ideally, these ideas
suggest that the NCSs should aim at combined efforts at both the collective and
the individual level. Concerning the collective leve!, the NCSs inc1ude several
efforts that may have effect. Education efforts, information, continuous
deliberation of the strategies in the councils, participation from the various
agencies in the preparation of the NCSs are all important here. Furthermore, the
strong ideological flair in the whole policy document and its form as a grand
strategy giv e it a symbolic importance. Symbolic actions are not wasted in this
perspective, they are expressions of commitment to key values. Expressing such
comrtment repeatedly may lead to acceptance throughout the system over time,
and influence actors' goals and values gradually.
However, operational goals, held by the actors in the system should also be
addressed. Both to produce changed common, collective goals, and to generate
action in the short run. Several informants seemed to think somewhat in line with
this reasoning, arguing that the point was not to implement everything at once, but
to get started, show some results and build experiences which would lead to more
firm commitment later on. At this point, the NCSs are less promising. When it
comes to immediate action in the many offices, field services and agencies, the
NCSs mainly stick to the traditional top-down approach. Decisions about problem
priorities and definitions, goals and means, designation of responsibilities to other
organisations and development of more specific goals and means were mainly
concentrated in a rather small group of policy makers. The perspective applied
here argues that one should take the probIerns, values and goals of for instance
Botswana's Forestry Unit as the starting point, and analyze what probIerns this
unit were concerned with, what they saw as urgent, how they could be assisted
and influenced. Which would in turn give the unit new experience, changed goals
and values, and acceptance of new collective goals of a more conservation biased
nature.
The NCS preparation does include some measures of this kind. The agencies were
asked to participate in producing background papers for the NCSs. However, this
was done within defined values given at the outset by the NCS policy makers,
values that the agencies were asked to operationalise in their sectors. What room
there actually was for these agencies to take their own problem perceptions,
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interests and goals as a basic premise is uncertain. Observing the striking
similarity of the conservation policies between the two countries, one may ask
whether existing goals, values and interests were really taken very seriously in all
sectors. Some of these previous goals and values are indeed not very desirable
from a conservationist point of view. But they are the goals which exist, which are
operational, and it is argued in this perspective that any change must start from
that basis. The NCSs are expected in both countries to lead to the formulation of
even more specific action plans. Perhaps that would be an occasion to develop
agency participation further. This also includes field staff, and it is probably here
that the need is the greatest.
In this latter view, implementation should not be evaluated in terms of how
precisely a plan is able to direct action, but rather in terrns of the quality of the
mutual interaction between formal policy makers, implementors and the general
context. In fact, it may be advantageous for a policy to be adjusted this way. In
our case, the most important question is not whether the NCSs can be forced into
practice as they are formulated. Instead, we may look at them as a body of
thought, largely developed outside the governmental systems in the two countries,
and as a challenge to these systems. The arnbition is not whether it can be put into
practice as it is, but whether it may engage in interaction with local and national
actors, and stimulate learning, development of indigenous knowledge, improved
problem understanding and changed collective goals. This is important not least
in Africa, where organisational models, policy principles, technology and
management techniques are of ten imported from the western world.
The probIerns and prospects for controlled and intentional organisational change
in African state bureaucracies represent an insufficiently explored fie1d. This is
particularly the case for reforms attempting to alter values and action programs of
organisations. In his review of a whole range of reform experiences in Africa.
Mutahaba (1989) notes in his conclusion, that reforms aimed at qualitative changes
in the performance of governmental agencies have not much been examined. For
instance training programs aimed at increasing innovation and sensitivity to
popular needs.
There is thus a need for research on how the African political-administrative
systems change. The perspective outlined above emphasize that they change not
least by implementing, which brings new problems to attention, and which gives
new experiences and knowledge. The distinction between a collective and an actor
level is a promising approach not least in African countries where formal offcial
goals are often strange for most officiaIs, being developed in the donor community
and by researchers from the western world. How such concepts, values and goals
interact with the indigenous administration' s values and interests should be more
closely examined. The NCSs wil therefore be worth following in the years to
come.
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